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Cartels are known for their innovative smuggling techniques, across land, sea, or 
air, which allow them to clandestinely transport drugs across any point of entry into the 
United States. With this in mind, it is worth asking: why do cartels choose a certain drug 
smuggling technique over another, which domain is more commonly used and potentially 
more successful, and what sorts of structural changes would it take to shift from one 
method or domain to another? When seeking answers, there are several things to take 
into consideration: law enforcement is limited in funding, personnel, and assets, which 
creates endless smuggling opportunities for cartels. Additionally, cartels exploit 
weak law enforcement and judicial systems, as well as corrupt officials in 
several countries throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean. 
Even though cartels sometimes fail, their persistence and motivation are what cause 
them to be successful. The last consideration is money, which is the main driving 
factor that causes cartels to switch from one domain to another, or from one method to 
another. The end result stands firm: cartels benefit most and are more successful using 
methods in the land domain, specifically tunnels.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Cartel kingpins, such as El Chapo Guzman, have proven that in their 
organizations they are able to apply advances in technology and to innovate so as to 
continue illicit drug smuggling operations into the United States. Additionally, not only 
do cartels use innovation and technology for smuggling, they also use it for other things, 
such as assisting in El Chapo’s escape from jail. El Chapo is notoriously known for 
escaping from jail in 2001, and in 2015, he was able to escape a second time using a 
tunnel that began at a construction site in a neighborhood just under a mile away from the 
prison where he was being held.1 Additionally, according to a New York Times article, 
“The tunnel was equipped with lighting, ventilation and a motorcycle on rails that was 
probably used to transport digging material and cart the dirt out.”2 Fortunately, in early 
2017, the drug lord was captured once again and extradited to the United States.3 While 
most operations remain clandestine, it is important to note that cartels are willing to do 
whatever it takes to liberate their leaders so that business can resume. 
Why are cartels becoming more powerful, especially in their ability to adapt and 
use technology? Cartels generate huge revenues and use these monies to hire engineers, 
farmers, and other subject matter experts to gain the upper hand on how to most 
effectively smuggle drugs into the United States or other countries. Most individuals are 
motivated by money, and in the cartels case, money well spent on new forms of 
technology and innovation goes a lot further than what money can do for the 
overwhelmed law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies are limited in funds, 
while cartels are not. With all of this in mind, the major questions guiding this research 
                                                 
1 Larry Buchanan, Josh Keller, and Derek Watkins, “How Mexico’s Most-Wanted Drug Lord Escaped 
from Prison (Again),” The New York Times, January 8, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/
07/13/world/americas/mexico-drug-kingpin-prison-escape.html?_r=0.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Phil Gast, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Evan Perez, “Extradited ‘El Chapo’ Guzman Arrives in US; 
Hearing Set for Friday,” CNN, January 20, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/19/us/el-chapo-guzman-
turned-over-to-us/.  
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project are: why do cartels choose a certain drug smuggling technique over another; 
which domain is more commonly used and potentially more successful; and what sorts of 
structural changes would it take to shift from one method or domain to another? The 
purpose of this thesis is to explore these questions and to develop an explanation for 
which domain (land, sea, or air) is most beneficial to cartels for transportation of drugs, 
and what changes in current methods determine the conversion to another. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature discusses how different researchers have answered the following 
questions: how and why has drug smuggling historically happened; what have states done 
to repress it; what are the prevalent methods and techniques in the air, land, and sea 
domains that cartels practice; which domain is more successful or more efficient; and 
how, or why, do cartels change from one domain to another? It is important to compare 
these discussions among scholars because there is a gap in literature in regard to 
analyzing the three domains; and which one is more beneficial over the other. Although, 
some things to consider that could cause change is most likely law enforcement presence, 
profits, assets, availability, and risks. The following sections provides insight from many 
different scholars on the different domains and the business of cartels. 
1. How Has Smuggling Evolved? 
The illicitness of drugs is contextually bound. In some periods, certain drugs are 
legal while in other periods they are not. According to Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda,  
cocaine, coca wine or tonic, morphine, heroin and marijuana—were widely 
available in the late nineteenth century and were readily prescribed by 
practitioners ignorant of the possible dangers, who recommended them to 
patients by virtue of their many therapeutic benefits, particularly pain 
relief.4  
As these drugs became abused, they also became a concern within the political arena. For 
instance, in the American context, the “Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 allowed 
                                                 
4 Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda, Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism and Violence in the New 
Narcoeconomy (New York: Zed Books, 2012), 13. 
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narcotics to be used only for medical purposes.”5 Furthermore, after the temperance 
movement, not only alcohol, but all “drug use was publicly condemned.”6 While drug 
production in the United States began to deteriorate, individuals were no longer seeking 
drugs within the United States, but in other drug producing countries,7 which resulted in 
the rise of drug smuggling. Peter Andreas stated that due to “their compact size and low 
weight relative to value, smuggled drugs were much harder to detect than smuggled 
alcohol.”8 The political agenda sets the stage for drug smuggling. In the American 
context, drugs were outlawed to help drug addicts gain control of their lives.9 However, 
the demand for drugs would only increase through to present day. The attempt to supply, 
while inelastic remand remained high, creates the space for major profits in the shadows 
of the law.10 Additionally, due to implemented laws and increased law enforcement, drug 
smuggling was the only way, other than prescriptions, that addicts could get their drugs.  
To repress the drug smuggling problem, the United States has consistently 
detained individuals and removed drugs from streets around major cities and suburbs. 
Additionally, according to Andreas, “The war on drugs was ramped up even further by 
Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, including drafting the military to take on a more 
frontline antidrug role.”11 He also stated,  
The fiscal 1989 National Defense Authorization Act charged the Defense 
Department with three new responsibilities…. It was made the lead 
agency for detecting drug traffic into the country; given responsibility for 
integrating all command, control, and communications for drug 
interdiction into an effective network; and told to approve and fund state 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 15. 
6 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 256.  
7 Ibid., 263.  
8 Ibid., 266.  
9 Ibid., 273.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., 284.  
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governors’ plans for using the National Guard in interdiction and 
enforcement.12  
While the military and all forms of law enforcement increased their role in drug 
interdiction, they did not and cannot halt the flow of illicit drugs entering the United 
States.  
Mexico has been directly affected by the United States’ actions to counter drug 
smuggling. According to Watt and Zepeda, “By 1914 counternarcotic legislation in the 
United States had led to the first major organized offensives against the smuggling of 
contraband from Mexico.”13 This offensive led to “an illegal industry and became a 
major source of revenue for those involved in it.”14 Watt and Zepeda describe smuggling 
as “providing handsome profits, due to regions blighted by extreme poverty, hardship and 
inequality.”15 Additionally, according to Watt and Zepeda, smuggling can be found 
“particularly in a land marked by official corruption and a lack of legitimate employment 
opportunities.”16 Corruption and poverty thrives in many countries around the world and 
can be motivation to commit acts, such as drug smuggling, because the individuals’ 
perceptions of becoming corrupt and committing said acts means they will quickly rise 
out of poverty. Corruption and poverty are two motivating factors for some individuals, 
however, law enforcement and legitimate governments adapt and continue the fight 
against drug smuggling. 
2. The Research on Land Drug Smuggling 
What do we know about land drug smuggling into the United States? The land 
border between the United States and Mexico is approximately 1,900 miles. Andreas 
argues, “the U.S.-Mexico border was the main entry point for smuggling drugs into the 
                                                 
12 Andreas, Smuggler Nation, 284–285.  
13 Watt and Zepeda, Drug War Mexico, 19.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 20.  
16 Ibid.  
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country,”17 but it was not until “the 1990s that the policing of smuggling became a high-
profile and high-intensity militarized border campaign commanding enormous public and 
media attention.”18 According to Peter Chalk, “Mexico serves as the principal point of 
entry to mainland United States, with the country presently accounting for as much as 90 
percent of all illicit imports to the United States.”19 In addition to Mexico, the president 
of the United States, as well as the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR), have listed all seven countries in Central America, and the big three from South 
America (Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru) “as major illicit drug producing and/or drug-
transit countries.”20 Since these countries have been listed as producers or transit 
countries of illicit drugs for many years, one can assume that these countries will 
continue to be on the list due to a “combination of geographic, commercial, and 
economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced, even if a government has 
carried out the most assiduous narcotics control law enforcement measures.”21 As these 
countries continue the fight against drug smuggling, it is important to identify the 
methods and techniques cartels use to smuggle drugs through Central America, to 
Mexico, and ultimately across the border into the United States. Figure 1 depicts Mexican 
drug smuggling routes into the United States, and Figure 2 provides an example of drug 
smuggling routes through Panama. Figure 2 can be used as a reference for the other 
Central American countries. 
                                                 
17 Andreas, Smuggler Nation, 291.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/
RAND_MG1076.pdf, 6. 
20 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1, Drug and Chemical Control (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268025.pdf, 4. 
21 Ibid.  
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Figure 1.  Mexican Drug Smuggling Routes into the United States22 
 
 
Figure 2.  Example of Drug Smuggling Routes through Panama: Same Potential 
for the Other Six Countries in Central America23 
                                                 
22 Source: Suvy Boyina, “The Largest American Security Threat is the North American Drug War,” 
Suvy’s Thoughts (blog), February 24, 2015, http://suvysthoughts.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-largest-
american-security-threat-is.html.  
23 Source: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “Cocaine from South America to the United 
States,” in Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment 
(Vienna: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf, 33.  
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As technology rapidly advanced, and inventions create new possibilities, cartels 
manage to grab ahold and quickly revolutionize methods and techniques of smuggling. 
For example, Christian Borys stated that “Technological evolutions like liquid cocaine, 
hyperspeed boats, and cartel submarines, have completely changed the game when it 
comes to policing drugs.”24 Scott Decker and Margaret Chapman gathered information 
from a detained smuggler who stated, “crossing the border between the two countries was 
very easy, with the eight thousand kilos hidden in a compartment in the gas tank of a 
commercial vehicle.”25 To add to this list, Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg stated, “cars, 
trucks, rail cars, cattle, turkeys, cannons, and even dead bodies”26 are used to conceal 
shipments of drugs into the United States. While mules are typically known as being 
body packers; “those who swallow packets of drugs or hide them in their vagina or 
rectum to avoid detection by customs officials.”27 Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg have 
also explained, “Knowing that the U.S. will not prosecute a minor for illegally bringing 
drugs across the border, cartels are using more 16- and 17-year olds, and younger kids, to 
bring across drug shipments.”28 However, the human body is fairly limited in the amount 
of drugs it can hold. Now that the evolution of drug smuggling methods has been 
explained, it is important to understand what measures the United States and foreign 
countries have taken to respond to this. 
The United States Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) currently has “315 
large-scale (LS) and 4,204 small-scale (SS) NII systems, 1,281 radiation portal monitors 
                                                 
24 Christian Borys, “Drug Smuggling is Getting a High Tech Makeover,” Vice Motherboard [blog], 
December 11, 2014, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/drug-smuggling-is-getting-a-high-tech-
makeover.  
25 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling: Lessons 
from the Inside (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 63.  
26 James R. Phelps, Jeffrey Daily, and Monica Koenigsberg, Border Security (Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2014), 294.  
27 M. J. R. Lancashire et al., “Surgical Aspects of International Drug Smuggling,” British Medical 
Journal 296, no. 6628 (1988): 1035, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29530344.pdf.  
28 Ibid.  
 8
(RPMs), and 35,538 SS RDEs.”29 In addition to its inspection and detection equipment, 
USCBP also uses a wide range of surveillance equipment. For example, Randolph Alles, 
Mark Borkowski, and Ronald Vitiello report using the following surveillance systems:  
Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems, Remote Video Surveillance 
Systems (RVSS), Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems (MVSS), Agent 
Portable Surveillance System (APSS), Unattended Ground Sensors 
(UGS), the Tactical Aerostats and Re-locatable Towers program and many 
aircraft equipped with radar systems that assist the ground systems.30  
They also report that “the absence of surveillance technology would limit their ability to 
detect, identify, classify, track, and rapidly respond to illicit activity.”31 Technology 
plays a major role in USCBP operations.32 
In 2007, the United States established the Mérida Initiative, developing further 
into the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), to support Mexico and 
Central American countries in their fight against drug smuggling.33 The Mérida Initiative, 
as Clare Seelke described, “is a U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and 
Central America, which mainly provides equipment and training, resulting in a new kind 
of regional security partnership.”34 Since 2008, the United States has provided $2.5 
billion for the Mérida Initiative.35 However, according to Clare Seelke and Kristin 
                                                 
29 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Inspection and Detection Technology: Multi-Year Investment 
and Management Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016-Aug/inspection-detection-multiyearinvest-
plan.pdf, 5.  
30 Border Security Gadgets, Gizmos, and Information: Using Technology to Increase Situational 
Awareness and Operational Control: Hearing before the United States House of Representatives, 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 114th Cong., 2 (2016) 
(joint statement of Randolph D. Alles, Executive Assistance Commissioner, Air and Marine Operations, 
Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, and Ronald 
Vitiello, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796062, 3–4.  
31 Ibid., 4.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Clare Ribando Seelke, “Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy 
Issues,” in The Mérida Initiative: U.S. Counterdrug and Anticrime Assistance for Mexico, ed. Isabella A. 
Vaughne (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2010), 3–8.  
34 Ibid., 3.  
35 “Mérida Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, accessed October 15, 2016, https://www.state.gov/
j/inl/merida/.  
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Finklea, “while bilateral efforts have yielded some results, the weakness of Mexico’s 
criminal justice system may have limited the effectiveness of those efforts.”36 They 
report that Mexico struggles with its ability to seize drugs before they are smuggled into 
the United States, even though it has received a multitude of equipment and supplies 
from the United States supposed to increase interdiction at the borders.37 Additionally, 
they stated, “while Mexico has made arresting drug kingpins a top priority, it has not 
given equal attention to the need to increase drug seizures,”38 which shows more or less 
that Mexico is still not emphasizing drug seizures as a priority.  
Similar to Mexico, countries in Central America receive “equipment, training, and 
technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement operations”39 from the United 
States. However, according to Peter Meyer and Clare Seelke, “Despite indications of 
progress in certain communities, most country-level security indicators have yet to show 
significant improvements.”40 Natasha Everheart argues, “without evaluation tools, policy 
coordination remains difficult: everyone is measuring the success of slightly different 
programs differently without a strong connection to the long-term goals of the 
initiative.”41 While the United States has done a lot for Mexico and the Central American 
countries, Congress should reevaluate these initiatives. 
3. Maritime Drug Smuggling 
What do we know about maritime smuggling into the United States? Unlike the 
limited 1,900-mile U.S.-Mexico border that drug smugglers face, the open ocean is a much 
bigger playing field, which increases the number of routes smugglers can take to bypass 
                                                 
36 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida 
Initiative and Beyond (CRS Report No. R41349) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2015), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=765713, 1.  
37 Ibid., 20. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Peter Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background 
and Policy Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R41731) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf, 16.  
40 Ibid., 22. 
41 Natasha Everheart, “Revisiting the Central America Regional Security Initiative,” Journal of Public 
and International Affairs (2016): 50, http://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/jpia-book-2016.pdf#page=44.  
 10
law enforcement and get their illicit drugs into the United States. According to the United 
States Coast Guard (USCG), “the marine areas under U.S. jurisdiction are enormous, 
covering over 4.5 million square miles of ocean area and 95,000 miles of coastline.”42 
The USCBP strategic plan Vision and Strategy 2020, determines that the USCBP 
will share the same patrolling responsibilities as the USCG.43 Smugglers do not need 
specific points of entry. Every inch of coastline, including but not limited to ports, is of 
potential value. Michael Atkinson, Moshe Kress, and Roberto Szechtman note that there 
are three corridors that smugglers use to make their way towards the United States:44 “the 
Eastern Pacific (EastPac), the Western Caribbean (WCarib), and the Eastern Caribbean 
(ECarib).”45 Figure 3 illustrates these corridors.  
                                                 
42 U.S. Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2014), 
https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/docs/uscg_whem_2014.pdf, 37. 
43 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Vision and Strategy 2020: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: U.S Customs and Border Protection, 2016), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf, 18. 
44 Michael P. Atkinson, Moshe Kress, and Roberto Szechtman, “Maritime Transportation of Illegal 





Figure 3.  Major Drug Smuggling Corridors into the United States46 
Gaps in maritime security is detrimental to the economy of the United States. 
According to Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg, “An expansive network of cooperation has 
developed between government and the private sector, to accomplish the objective to 
secure the Maritime Domain while maintaining the smooth flow of international 
commerce.”47 They also state that while “Human error, corruption, and compromise 
exists, the Maritime Domain has an unlimited number of potential threats.”48 However, 
they explain, “In an era of Global Positioning Satellites, Automatic Identification 
Systems, and RFID tracking, every effort is being made to secure the Maritime Domain 
and ensure Maritime Commerce moves unimpeded.”49 This statement specifically 
identifies maritime commerce is moving unimpeded; however, the same could be said for 
all maritime vessels. Now that the main corridors for drug smuggling have been 
identified, and factors that allow smugglers to be successful has been explained, it is 
                                                 
46 Source: “The CARICOM Blueprint for Illicit Drug Trafficking,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 
December 28, 2011, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/cbean.jpg.  
47 Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg, Border Security, 163.  
48 Ibid., 162–163.  
49 Ibid., 163.  
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important to capture the historical and current methods and techniques cartels use to 
convey drugs into the United States using the sea domain. 
When cruise liners were the most common vessels for leisure transport in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, individuals who came home from overseas business trips or 
vacations would typically smuggle jewelry, cigars, and watches.50 According to Andreas, 
“virtually anything could be used as a smuggling device: trunks with false bottoms, and 
other hidden compartments, hollow canes and heels, and even infants and children.”51 
Michael McNicholas adds, “There are hundreds of locations to hide drugs: cargo bays, 
ventilation shafts, crawl spaces, rope and storage lockers, engine room, accommodations, 
supply closets, life boats and so on.”52 However, cartels have steered away from 
commercial shipping and started building their own drug smuggling vessels, such as 
“low-profile vessels, semi-submersibles, submersibles, and towed narco ‘torpedoes.’”53 
Additionally, Patrick Keefe explains that cartels “Used crude semi-submersibles at first, 
then fully submersible subs, conceived by engineers and constructed under the canopy of 
the Amazon, then floated downriver in pieces and assembled at the coastline.”54 If cartels 
are interdicted, all they have to do is “pull a level that floods the interior so that the 
evidence sinks; only the crew is left bobbing in the water, waiting to be picked up by the 
authorities.”55 These vessels are built to avoid detection and can transport an enormous 
amount of drugs.  
As for now, cartels have unlimited opportunities on many different vessels that 
transit the ocean daily including “container ships, fishing vessels and go-fast boats.”56 
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51 Ibid., 185.  
52 Michael McNicholas, Maritime Security: An Introduction (Boston, MA: Elsevier Inc., 2008), 215.  
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54 Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” The New York Times, June 15, 2012, 
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NYTimes.pdf, 4.  
55 Ibid. 
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Cartels need only befriend or coerce someone or hijack someone’s vessel to transport 
their drugs; money is a great motivator to facilitate this. As drone technology improves 
and becomes even more accessible, cartels could take advantage and use underwater 
drones to transport their product across the ocean, totally eliminating the risk of capture, 
or death. Now that historical and current methods and techniques for maritime drug 
smuggling have been explained, it is important to understand what the United States and 
partnering countries have done to respond to the threat of drug smuggling in the sea 
domain. 
The United States has partnered with several Caribbean countries to create the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Just like the Merida Initiative and the Central 
America Initiative, the CBSI has problems of its own, even though “The Department of 
Defense also supports partner countries in the Caribbean through training, equipment, 
and information sharing, which complement CBSI.”57 Senators Dianne Feinstein and 
Charles Grassley describe the Caribbean countries’ vulnerabilities to drug trafficking as 
“their geographic location, large coastlines, and small criminal justice systems.”58 
Feinstein and Grassley also say that 
Many Caribbean countries lack the domestic capacity to fully respond to 
drug trafficking and other transnational threats. As small islands, many 
Caribbean countries have limited ability to fund the law enforcement 
coverage needed to control their large coastlines and territorial waters. 
Further, many Caribbean states face domestic challenges related to 
poverty, high rates of unemployment, social inequality, and inadequate 
criminal justice systems, further hampering their ability to combat the 
influence of the region’s drug trade.59  
Because the Caribbean countries are unable to control their territorial waters, drug 
smugglers are more likely to exploit these waters.  
                                                 
57 Dianne Feinstein and Charles Grassley, Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [memo] (GAO-13-167R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653173.pdf, 5.  
58 Ibid., 1. 
59 Ibid., 3–4. 
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The Deputy for Operations Policy and Capabilities of the USCG, Rear Admiral 
William D. Lee, said, “last year, our cutter and aircraft crews removed over 77 metric 
tons of cocaine and 35 tons of marijuana in the 6-million-square-mile Transit Zone,”60 
which “is a decrease of approximately 30 metric tons from fiscal year 2012, which is 
attributed, in part, to the reduction in aircraft and cutter patrol hours under 
sequestration.”61 The USCG, United States Navy (USN), and USCBP are seizing drugs 
on the high seas, but lack of assets greatly affect their ability to increase drug interdiction 
efforts. Admiral Papp ruminates, “much like the weather and the seas we face on a daily 
basis, the Coast Guard cannot control the fiscal environment in which we operate.”62  
Multiple high-ranking U.S. military officers are talking about the need for 
additional assets for drug interdiction, which is why it is so confusing to see that there has 
been a proposal to cut the budget of the USCG and additional federal agencies. General 
John Kelly, former Commander, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), 
and Secretary of Homeland Security in President Trump’s administration stated,  
USSOUTHCOM has limited Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance assets, limited Coast Guard cutter assets due to their own 
limitations, and limited surface combatants provided by the Navy due to 
the entire decommission of the Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile 
frigates.63  
While this statement is now echoed by Admiral Tidd in his posture statement before the 
115th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee,64 fiscal year 2017 funding for the 
                                                 
60 What Does a Secure Maritime Border Look Like: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border and 
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USCG is predicted to decrease.65 According to Richard Sisk, “Coast Guard Admiral Paul 
Zukunft has been outspoken in calling for more resources for a service struggling to 
maintain more than 50-year-old cutters amid increasing demands to cut off the flow of 
drugs from South America.”66 While the USCG, USN, and USCBP are interdicting as 
much as they can with what they have, they are not making nearly as big of a dent in 
counter drug smuggling operations as they would like. 
4. Air Drug Smuggling 
What do we know about air smuggling into the United States? Ever since the 
invention of the aircraft, the government, private companies, and individuals conducting 
research and development have been actively seeking multiple ways to use aircraft for 
multiple reasons ranging from personnel transport, to cargo transport, to combat 
payloads. One thing that law enforcement did not count on was the cartels’ vision of what 
these aircraft could do for their organizations. According to Andreas, “One of Escobar’s 
business partners, Carlos Lehder Rivas, is credited with pioneering the transportation of 
cocaine through the Caribbean to the United States by small aircraft.”67 Additionally, 
Andreas has described, 
At the height of his trafficking career in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Lehder took over Norman’s Cay, a tiny island in the Bahamas, and turned 
it into his own private airstrip. Government authorities in Nassau were 
suspected of taking hefty bribes to look the other way, tolerating Lehder’s 
transport business until U.S. pressure and media coverage finally 
prompted them to shut it down.68  
While Andreas speaks about exploiting the Caribbean countries, Keefe posits, 
“Cartel operatives moved cocaine into Mexico in small private aircraft and in baggage 
smuggled on commercial flights and eventually on their own 747s, which they could load 
                                                 
65 Richard Sisk, “Opposition Grows to Proposed Coast Guard Budget Cuts,” DOD Buzz, March 8, 
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66 Ibid.  
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with as much as 13 tons of cocaine.”69 Robert Filippone supports both Andreas and 
Keefe by remarking, “trans-shipment points throughout the Caribbean, Mexico, and 
Central America were necessary because direct flights from Colombia to the United 
States are impossible for many aircraft and require so much fuel for others that the 
amount of cocaine that can be carried is minimal.”70  
Airports have significantly increased security and while doing so have generated 
pathways in catching human smugglers. According to Paul Algra, Byron Brogdon, and 
Roque Marugg, “the majority of smugglers enter through Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport 
on flights from Venezuela, Surinam, or the Dutch Antilles.”71 In addition to the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom also suffered from human smugglers entering through 
airports. According to Lancashire et al., “Of the 56 drug seizures at ports in the United 
Kingdom, 39 were made at London Heathrow Airport and 11 at London Gatwick 
Airport,”72 which is approximately 90 percent of the seizures occurring at airports. As 
smuggling evolved, cartels are taking to new technology, including drones and ultralight 
aircraft. 
Kristina Davis, of Los Angeles Times, reported in a news article that “28 pounds 
of heroin made it across the U.S.-Mexico border by drone, making it the first cross-
border seizure by U.S. law enforcement involving the new smuggle-by-air tactic.”73 As 
for the ultralight aircraft, Dave Demarjian of Wired, reported, “According to Dick 
Knapinski, a spokesperson with the Experimental Aircraft Association, the ultralights 
currently being used by smugglers are so small that they’re not even classified as aircraft 
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by the FAA.”74 Both, drones and ultra-lights, are extremely hard to detect on radar, but 
cannot hold large quantities of drugs. In January 2015, Cable News Network (CNN) 
reported that smugglers used a drone to transport approximately six pounds of crystal 
meth from Mexico to the United States, but the operation failed when the drone went 
down because of the weight of the payload. The drone carrying crystal meth landed in a 
parking lot in Tijuana, Mexico.75 Now that we know drug smugglers use commercial 
airliners, drones, ultralight vehicles, and humans to smuggle drugs, it is important to 
understand how the United States and partner countries have responded to this threat. 
The United States employs the USCG, USN, and USCBP personnel to combat 
drug smuggling operators trying to penetrate ports of entry into the United States. While 
this is a major threat, the use of relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) systems 
have been effective in countering it. For example, according to Ellen Ferraro and Drew 
Ganter, “On May 1, 1989, ROTHR provided the joint Coast Guard/Customs center in 
Miami with critical detection information that led to an involved chase and the seizure of 
an aircraft carrying drugs to the Bahamas.”76 However, better technology and radar 
systems have evolved since 1989 and continue to be a critical piece of detecting and 
tracking illicit activity. For example, according to Alles, Borkowski, and Vitiello, “the 
Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) has a multi-mode radar for use over water and 
land, an electro-optical/infrared camera system, and a satellite communications system 
that is highly capable and a critical investment in CBP’s maritime, land, and aerial 
surveillance capabilities.”77 There are approximately 240 aircraft in the air and marine 
operations inventory,78 which include, but are not limited to: “P-3 Long Range Trackers 
and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, DHC-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, AS-350 
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helicopter, and various Unmanned Aerial Systems.”79 While the USCBP has many 
aircraft to patrol the waters surrounding the United States, the USCG and USN have a 
significantly larger arsenal, which shall not be discussed in this research due to its 
immensity. 
Caribbean countries give their due diligence in attempting to interdict drug 
smuggling operations. However, according to Mark Sullivan, “Despite these significant 
efforts, many governments in Latin America continue to suffer from overtaxed criminal 
justice systems, overwhelmed law enforcement and border control agencies, and 
extensive government corruption entrenched by deeply influential criminal kingpins.”80 
He adds, “many Latin American observers perceive that the continuing U.S. demand for 
illicit drugs is largely to blame.”81 Many Caribbean countries are not as sophisticated as 
the United States, which results in some countries unable to provide its own aircraft 
surveillance capabilities or other surveillance capabilities.82 
5. Debate on Which Domain Is More Successful or Most Efficient 
There is a gap in academic literature on which domain is more successful or most 
efficient for drug cartels. This is potentially because most scholars focus on economics 
and fluctuation of prices rather than the modes and techniques used across all domains, 
which could provide an explanation for why cartels use one domain over the other and 
which one generates more revenue in a given time. What this means is that scholars are 
looking at the supply and demand side of drug smuggling and their causes. Additionally, 
many scholars focus on the flow of money and how cartels use money to fund innovation 
or corruption to continue their illicit activities.  
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My thesis attempts to fill this gap in literature, which is there is no real debate as 
to whether land, sea, or air domain is the most successful or efficient. This is important 
because cartels can easily alter from one domain to another, which allows them to be 
masters of evasion and detection. Due to this fluctuation, it is hard to determine which 
domain cartels decidedly used over another. However, further research on this topic 
provides a general comparison of domains and how law enforcement could counter the 
organization, which could result in a potential switch from one domain to another, or 
simply a pause in operations. No one else debates these concepts, so my research is of the 
few comparisons of operating domains out there, which could benefit many organizations 
dealing directly with drug smuggling interdiction. 
C. THEORY 
While conducting research for this thesis, I concluded that cartels are more 
efficient and successful using methods of land smuggling than air or sea. Cartels can 
choose from multiple methods to get their drugs into the United States, including millions 
of vehicles or people, rail systems, tunnels, catapults, improvised launchers, or any other 
ingenious transportation devices. This is possible because for some of these 
transportation methods, cartels only need to have a receiving member of the organization 
on the other side of the border ready to pick up the transported drugs to attain custody of 
them. Additionally, cartels are constantly moving up and down the 1,900-mile border 
while alternating between methods to keep law enforcement guessing.  
Of the many methods I have listed, the cartels are most efficient at and benefit the 
most from using tunnels. Even though law enforcement has uncovered multiple tunnels, it 
is conceivable that law enforcement has not uncovered all tunnels leading from Mexico 
to the United States. That being said, the potentially undiscovered tunnels could generate 
never ending profits and provide a method that cartels can use whenever they want. 
Vehicles and mules pass through security at the border and must adhere to inspection 
regulations if drivers or mules desire entry into the United States. Law enforcement 
utilizes advanced technology in order to detect illegal immigrants and suspicious vehicle 
operators. Even President Trump’s administration is considering building a wall between 
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the United States and Mexico; however, this wall will not keep cartels from penetrating 
it. Building a wall will only motivate cartels even more. 
Cartels may continue to use maritime methods of transportation for smuggling; 
however, sea smuggling may never be as successful or efficient for cartels as land 
smuggling. There are several reasons why sea smuggling may never be as successful or 
efficient for cartels as land smuggling: 1) the ocean is an unforgiving force that could 
disrupt an operation by itself; 2) not only is there a large U.S. law enforcement presence 
on the ocean, there are also many international countries that patrol international waters 
and interdict smuggling operations; and 3) it is much harder to transport drugs through 
the ocean due to long trips that require fuel, food, and water for its crew, not to mention 
the possibility of the vessel breaking down. Cartels use three different methods to 
smuggle drugs in the sea domain: semi-submersible narco subs, panga go-fast boats, and 
container vessels. Of these three, panga-go fast boats are the most efficient and benefit 
cartels the most. This is because they are easily accessible and fairly inexpensive. Also, 
cartels can abandon these small vessels after the operation is complete with peace of 
mind knowing that law enforcement cannot track where the vessel originated from. Law 
enforcement can usually track the origin of semi-submersibles because they commonly 
use GPS and can track the origin of container vessels using the manifest paperwork. 
Panga boats are fast, making it difficult for law enforcement to catch them. 
Air smuggling methods are less efficient for cartels than either land or sea 
smuggling methods, and they are the least beneficial for cartels. Ever since 9/11, any 
suspicious activity on an aircraft catches the eye of law enforcement. Additionally, 
increased security at airports and detailed inspections at gate entries has somewhat 
deterred cartels. However, there have been a few cases of drug smuggling attempts 
reported on aircraft. Since security increased at airports, cartels have transitioned from 
using private aircraft to ultralight aircraft, which is the most common form of air 
smuggling cartels use. Cartels use these aircraft so often because it is easy for one pilot to 
cross the border, drop the drugs, and fly back across the border without being 
apprehended. While ultralight aircraft are the least risky option cartels use in the air 
domain, land domain methods are still preferable to cartels.  
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Cartels find it necessary to adjust from one domain to another for a variety of 
reasons. Most notably, as costs in one domain become more expensive, as law 
enforcement increases in a specific area or overall becomes more efficient at the border 
preventing and seizing larger amounts of drugs, or as return profits compared to 
expenditures are not as significant as they used to be, then cartels will most likely alter 
from land smuggling to sea, or air smuggling. As technology continues to develop and 
proves to be of further benefit to cartels, technology could be a determining factor of 
which method and domain they decide to use when attempting their smuggling 
operations. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis conducts plausibility probes, which, according to Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennet, “are preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and 
hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.”83 
Additionally, in conjunction with plausibility probes, this thesis uses counterfactual 
methods “which is the exploration of things that did not happen, but (conceivably) could 
have.”84 I will provide a cost-benefit model reflecting the initial expenditure of a cartels’ 
operation to the end profit while comparing across air, land, and sea domains. First, I 
examine different methods and techniques among land, sea, and air domains and make a 
determination as to which individual method is the most beneficial and most profitable 
for a cartels business. Second, I examine the domains as a whole and provide an 
explanation and analysis for the most beneficial and profitable domain for a cartels 
business. Third, I determine which domain is the largest threat to law enforcement based 
on a final table that will show the overall cost-benefit analysis and comparisons. Finally, 
given the realm of possibilities and which method is the most problematic, I provide a 
policy approach for law enforcement and Department of Defense (DOD) to use in their 
future operations of combating drug smuggling. 
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II. THE LAND DOMAIN OF DRUG SMUGGLING 
Metropolitan San Diego and Tijuana have become mega metropolis. On any given 
day in border cities between Mexico and the United States, millions of people cross back 
and forth. The same is true for most ports of entry, as North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) has dramatically increased trade between and crossings. However, 
people are not the only thing crossing the border. For instance, on October 24, 2015, 
“authorities confiscated at least 12 tons of marijuana with a street value of $6 million and 
arrested 22 people in San Diego and Tijuana in connection with one of the largest tunnels 
uncovered in recent years.”85 According to USCBP in October 18, 2016, “officers at the 
DeConcini pedestrian lanes referred a 50-year-old Mexican woman for further inspection 
and, thanks to a drug canine’s alert, discovered more than $57,000 worth of cocaine 
wrapped around her midsection.”86 The USCBP also reports that on May 1, 2017, 
“Border Patrol agents stopped a vehicle attempting to avoid the immigration checkpoint 
and found more than 67 pounds of marijuana, worth over $33K, concealed within a coffin 
in the hearse.”87 The uniting feature of all of these methods is that they are based on a 
land smuggling logic. In this chapter, I address three questions: 1) what are the prevalent 
land methods; 2) what are the institutional strategies to stop them; and 3) how much 
profit versus risk does this method engender?  
To contribute an answer to these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, 
I discuss the effectiveness of USCBP. Second, I elaborate a brief history of land drug 
smuggling, which includes specific methods for smuggling and means of transportation, 
as well as current methods and means of transportation of land drug smuggling. Third, I 
provide a cost-benefit analysis of drug flow using specific examples of transportation and 
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the costs given other examples of degree of enforcement. Fourth, I discuss the 
estimations of cocaine flows through overland routes, which are identified in a few 
sources for specific years because current year estimations are not available as of yet. 
Finally, I create a table that compares each method and determine which is best for 
cartels given lowest costs and highest benefits. 
A. THE RISKS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT: ORIGIN AND 
DESTINATION INSTITUTIONS 
Two factors present possible risks to drug trafficking. First, domestic enforcement 
by countries where drugs originate present the first risky set of hurdles. The second 
challenge, and arguably the more pronounced, is the United States enforcement 
mechanism. In this section, I discuss each in turn beginning with origin institutional 
problems. 
Corruption found in Central American countries is one of the biggest reasons drug 
smugglers are able to transport illicit drugs from the point of origin (mainly Colombia, 
Peru, or Bolivia) to the United States. The 2017 INCSR determines that all seven Central 
American countries continue to be “major illicit drug producing or drug-transit countries in 
Central America,”88 and Mexico and Colombia emulate Central America.89 
Since 2007, the amount of drugs smuggled through Central American countries has 
increased significantly from initially only small amounts of cocaine smuggled as destined 
for the United States to almost 85 percent of what is smuggled as destined for the United 
States.90 According to Meyer and Seelke, “stepped-up enforcement efforts in Mexico and 
instability in certain Central American countries have provided incentives for traffickers to 
use the region as a transshipment point.”91 Instability in Central American countries is not 
the only reason traffickers use the region as transshipment points. According to Clare 
Seelke et al., “Central America is a region with fewer resources and weaker institutions 
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with which to combat drug trafficking.”92 Additionally, President Obama’s Presidential 
Determination—Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal 
Year 2017 states, “a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors allow 
drugs to transit or be produced, even if a government has carried out the most assiduous 
narcotics control law enforcement measures.”93  
All of these countries have similar commonalities: corrupt governments willing to 
turn a blind eye, are weak, and sometimes have absent law enforcement agencies, 
geographical locations that benefit drug smugglers, and easily accessible ports and porous 
borders. Any government or law enforcement individual who is willing to take a bribe, so 
that drug smugglers can control their smuggling routes, may not be directly involved in 
the effects of the drug smuggling operation, but they are directly responsible for the 
continuous flow of drugs in and out of their respective countries. 
Conversely, U.S. institutions present more risk for overland routes. Specifically, 
the USCBP, which patrols nine sectors that range across the U.S.-Mexico border. Sectors 
in Texas include Big Bend, with 12 stations; Del Rio, with 10 stations; El Paso, with 11 
stations; Laredo, with nine stations; and Rio Grande Valley, with nine stations—for a 
total of 51 stations.94 Sectors in California include El Centro, with four stations, and San 
Diego, with eight stations for a total of 12 stations.95 Sectors in Arizona include Tucson, 
with eight stations; and Yuma, with three stations for a total of 11 stations.96 There are 74 
stations along the Mexico-U.S. border, and there are 11 other sectors with 62 stations 
throughout the rest of the United States, which is a grand total of 20 sectors with 136 
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stations throughout the United States.97 According to the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, there are 25 official ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, six in 
Arizona, six in California, two in New Mexico, and 11 in Texas.98 It is important to note 
that New Mexico has two official ports of entry, but does not have a single sector or 
station for which the USCBP is responsible. Obviously, cartels are not restricted to these 
25 official ports of entry. However, cartels have probably mastered blending in with 
traffic at these locations and, nevertheless, could use the official ports of entry. 
USCBP’s arsenal of technology includes fixed surveillance systems, mobile 
surveillance systems, and air and marine capabilities. For example, according to Alles, 
Borkowski, and Vitiello, “integrated fixed tower (IFT) systems are fixed surveillance 
assets that provide long-range persistent surveillance, cover very large areas and 
incorporate a Common Operating Picture (COP).”99 Additionally, they report, “the tower 
systems automatically detect and track items of interest, and provide the COP operator(s) 
with the data, video and geospatial location of selected items of interest to identify and 
classify them.”100 They further explain that remote video surveillance systems (RVSS), 
provide “short-, medium-, and long-range persistent surveillance mounted on stand-alone 
towers, or other structures,”101 and use “cameras, radio and microwave transmitters to 
send video to a control room and enables a control room operator to remotely detect, 
identify, classify and track targets using the video feed.”102 Mobile surveillance 
capabilities can enhance fixed surveillance capabilities. 
With advanced technology, Border Patrol agents found it easier to detect the 
movement of illicit drugs. For example, USCBP Deputy Commissioner Kevin 
McAleenan stated, “secure radio and satellite communication technology, fixed and 
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mobile surveillance capabilities, Tactical Aerostats and Re-Locatable Towers, and 
Integrated Fixed Towers assist with detecting, identifying, classifying, and tracking 
illegal activity.”103 Also, according to Alles, Borkowski, and Vitiello, “Mobile 
Surveillance Capability (MSC) systems provide long-range mobile surveillance and 
consist of a suite of radar and camera sensors mounted on Border Patrol vehicles.”104 
Without fixed and mobile surveillance technology, Alles, Borkowski, and Vitiello report, 
“the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and rapidly respond to 
illicit activity would be decreased”105 and that “these technologies not only provide 
significant security benefits and multiply the capabilities of law enforcement personnel to 
detect, identify, and respond to suspicious activity, but they also assist with public safety 
along the border.”106  
However, smugglers have taken advantage of technological changes as well. For 
example, according to Borys, “technological evolutions like liquid cocaine, hyper speed 
boats, and cartel submarines, have completely changed the game when it comes to 
policing drugs.”107 Smugglers may need to change their smuggling routes to remain 
undetected by border patrol. Continuously changing routes and methods of transportation 
keep border patrol agents and law enforcement guessing as to which route, or method 
smugglers would use to remain clandestine. While border patrol agents and law 
enforcement continue to pursue cartels and seize drugs, it is extremely difficult to locate 
and identify cartel organizations, which are masters of evasion. 
Without these various systems and capabilities, interdiction of drug smugglers 
would be more difficult than it currently is. Moreover, as technology continues to 
develop, seizures of illicit drugs have the potential to increase. Combining surveillance 
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systems and new technology results in better situational awareness for those who conduct 
counter drug smuggling operations. These systems, when used simultaneously, can 
increase detection and tracking, while also identifying suspicious activity in multiple 
places simultaneously. USCBP will continue to use advanced technology to detect and 
track suspicious activity; however, it will continue to interdict only small amounts of 
cocaine at the U.S.-Mexico border.108 Therefore, USCBP is not very effective when 
comparing its equipment and resources to the amount of drugs it seizes yearly. 
B. HISTORICAL METHODS OF LAND SMUGGLING 
Before the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 made certain drugs illegal, Congress 
implemented an alcohol prohibition, which began on January 16, 1920109 and ended on 
December 5, 1933.110 This prohibition motivated Mexicans and Canadians to smuggle 
alcohol into the United States. For example, according to Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg, 
“Tequila and Mescal began to flow north from Mexico in wagons and on the backs of 
donkeys and pack mules, and rum, ale and beer began to flow south from Canada, in boats, 
cars and trucks.”111 After alcohol prohibition ended in 1933 and drug prohibition gradually 
came into effect, Border Patrol manning steadily rose from 723 to 1531 by the end of 
World War II and continued to increase over time.112 Today, USCBP employs 19,828 
border patrol agents, making up approximately one third of the agency.113 What was once 
a severely undermanned agency fighting against illicit drug smuggling is now a combined 
federal and state effort in the face of adaptation and change. 
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Wagons, donkeys, boats, cars, and trucks were not the only forms of transporting 
illicit drugs across the border. Suit cases and luggage were, and continue to be, forms of 
transportation of contraband. What was once used for smuggling exotic animals into the 
United States,114 can currently be used to smuggle in illicit drugs. Phelps, Daily, and 
Koenigsberg explain the main reason individuals would smuggle exotic animals into the 
United States is because “a bird caught in the rain forest and sold there is worth $20, but 
that same bird sells for $2,000 to $4,000 in the United States.”115 The same can be said 
for cocaine. For example, Scott Stewart reports in his Business Insider news article that 
“a kilogram of cocaine can be purchased for $2,200 in the jungles in Colombia’s interior, 
$5,500 to $7,000 at Colombian ports, and $24,000 to $27,000 wholesale on the street in 
the United States depending on the location.”116 While the wholesale figures seem like a 
lot, the retail value can be upward of $200,000 per 100 milligrams.117 One could claim 
that cartels may be solely motivated by the foreseeable profits. Figure 4 determines the 
cocaine value chain. 
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Figure 4.  Cocaine Value Chain118 
C. THE BENEFITS OF CURRENT METHODS OF LAND SMUGGLING 
According to a Vice News article, “Some 196 tons of cocaine are needed to satisfy 
U.S. demand, a flow valued at $38 billion.”119 Cartels continuously resupply drugs into 
the United States because they know some Americans yearn for drugs. Despite historical 
methods, cartels have used innovation and advanced technology to create successful 
methods and techniques of getting their drugs into the United States. Current methods of 
land smuggling include all possible hiding places in the millions of cars and trucks 
crossing the border daily; donuts sprinkled with cocaine; watermelons, pineapples, 
stuffed chili peppers, fake carrots, and other produce; catapults; and tunnels. Since the 
United States must have a sustained flow of $38 billion in drugs yearly, one can assume 
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that if cartels increase their production and attempt more cross border smuggling 
operations, then the value of $38 billion is a modest estimate. 
D. SEEING LIKE A CARTEL: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAND 
SMUGGLING 
Cartels rely on many resources to transport their drugs. Furthermore, according to 
Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg, “Cartels are extremely innovative in getting their drug 
shipments across borders.”120 As technology continues to advance and remain accessible 
to everyone, cartels may develop unlimited means of avoiding law enforcement. This 
means that law enforcement must remain vigilant and continue using innovative 
technology to not only stay with but stay ahead of drug smuggling operations. 
Cartels may run into certain risks during drug smuggling operations. Putting aside 
these risks, cartels really focus on the cost of transportation versus the profit of a 
successful smuggling operation. In the following sections, cars, trucks, tunnels, and 
mules, the most common overland modes of transportation, are examined to show 
potential profits if cartels are successful. This is possible by using counterfactual 
methods. 
1. Potential Profit via Personal Vehicles 
Since the invention of the automobile, individuals have sometimes hid things they 
did not want law enforcement to see, and this stays true in the present day. People use 
cars for many different things, but one reason cartels use them is specifically to hide 
illicit drugs from law enforcement when crossing into the United States. How much does 
a car cost for this type of mission? That depends. If cartels want to have the most profit, 
they will buy a cheap car. Cheap cars on the Internet can range from hundreds to 
thousands of dollars. If individuals who are smuggling want to evade law enforcement by 
speeding away, those cars get more expensive, tipping into the hundreds of thousands. 
But what does this mean? It does not matter how expensive the car is because even if the 
cartels go with a more expensive car, they can still generate a huge profit. For example, 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
 32
David Hernandez reports in a news article, “U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
officers confiscated 808 pounds of narcotics, valued at almost $2.8 million, hidden in 
various vehicles—inside a fuel tank, spare tire, dashboard, quarter panels and other 
areas—at several ports of entry.”121 If the operation was successful, the cartels could 
have claimed at least $2 million in potential revenue. Although $2 million seems like a 
lot, if cartels were to use SUVs or vans that could hold more drugs, they could generate 
even higher profits.  
Analyzing data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics reveals nearly 76 
million personal vehicles crossed the U.S.-Mexico border in 2016.122 A typical car, for 
example a Honda Accord, can transport 38 pounds of cocaine worth approximately 
$500,000.123 That being said, suppose 10 percent of personal vehicles were transporting 
illicit drugs into the United States, and only 2 percent of those vehicles were successful. 
Cartels would still be able to generate a revenue of $76 billion. Even if 0.5 percent of 
vehicles transporting cocaine were successful, the revenue would be $19 billion. These 
revenues would not necessarily be generated all at once because with increased border 
security, cartels must be careful when and where they send vehicles containing illicit 
drugs. 
2. Big Rigs and Big Profits? 
There are not as many big rig (semi) trucks that transit the U.S.-Mexico border as 
there are private vehicles; however, there are still a significant amount that do transit the 
border. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, nearly six million trucks and 
an additional four million loaded truck containers crossed the border in 2016.124 Trucks 
crossing the southern border have increased significantly since 2002, which at that time 
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had a total of 1.4 million truck crossings.125 However, since 80 percent of trade with 
Mexico is via land, the increase was necessary. Policy specialists Wasem et al. report 
former CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner as stating in 2004 that “two years ago, 10.3% 
of trucks entering the United States were inspected either intrusively or non-
intrusively;”126 however, that percentage increased to 15.1 percent in 2004.127 It is 
impossible to inspect every container and every truck because doing so would 
unnecessarily inhibit the flow of economical trade. It would also take a great deal of 
resources to inspect every container and every truck. 
While only 15.1 percent of trucks entering the United States at the southern 
border are inspected,128 84.9 percent of trucks are not. This means cartels have ample 
opportunities to utilize trucks in their smuggling operations. In January 2016, Christopher 
Woody reported, “In December, police in Chicago were tipped off to the arrival of a 
tomato shipment with 54 kilos of cocaine in it—drugs with a street value of almost $7 
million.”129 Despite this, cartels are extremely organized and are able to get their drugs a 
significant distance from the southern border. 
Over six million trucks cross the border. Suppose cartels targeted 100 trucks to 
transport illicit drugs into the United States? Alternatively, if cartels wanted buy a truck 
and simply camouflage it to resemble a legitimate container truck, they would need to 
purchase three pieces: the tractor, trailer, and container worth anywhere from $40,000 to 
a few hundred thousand dollars collectively. If one truck can transport 54 kilos of 
cocaine, and cartels use 100 trucks and are successful with each one, the profit is $700 
million. Comparing expenditure to profit, cartels might spend $10 million on 100 trucks, 
but get $700 million for cocaine in the United States. Risks tend to be the same for any 
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vehicle. There is a chance of secondary inspection, which would lead to a possible 
physical inspection of all compartments; there is a chance that USCBP may identify false 
plates or a random inspection with a K-9 unit could lead to detecting drugs. 
3. The Underground World of Smuggling 
Land border smuggling can be complicated by many factors such as weather, 
terrain, and manmade obstacles. While it is difficult to go unnoticed at a well patrolled 
border, innovation and technology assist cartels in their clandestine operations. For 
example, cartels use boring machines, which create underground tunnels for transporting 
illicit drugs from Mexico into the United States.130 On April 20, 2016, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) discovered one of the longest tunnels, around 800 
yards, running from Tijuana, Mexico into Otay Mesa industrial park in California.131 It is 
only one of 75 tunnels from Mexico to the United States that have been detected over the 
last five years;132 there are doubtlessly more tunnels yet undiscovered. 
Drug smugglers have been using tunnels since the late 1980s.133 According to 
Polly Mosendz, “more than 80 tunnels have been discovered between Mexico and the 
United States since 2006.”134 How much would it cost to construct a tunnel that runs 
from Mexico to the United States? According to Mosendz, “even with slave labor, 
tunnels of this kind can cost $1 million to $2 million to build.”135 Additionally, he posits, 
“it would take roughly six months to complete a tunnel that runs about 2,880 feet.”136 
With this in mind, a tunnel creates endless deliveries of cocaine into the United States, 
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which results in endless profits so long as the tunnel can remain hidden from law 
enforcement. The risks involved are individuals being detained by USCBP, losing a large 
shipment of drugs, or authorities seizing the tunnel. 
In 2016, one of the largest tunnels ever was uncovered in California. A news 
release summary, produced by the Southern District of California, provided a statement 
from U.S. Attorney Laura Duffy in which she said, “few would ever suspect that 
traffickers were moving multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana worth tens of 
millions of dollars in such an unassuming way.”137 Tunnel investigations take several 
months,138 and USCBP and local law enforcement will continue to pursue the relentless 
tunnel smugglers. 
4. The Human Mule Packers and Drug Enforcement 
Many people have heard of the term “mule” or simply, body packer. When an 
individual decides to become a mule, “they can swallow 50–100 packets of up to 1 kg 
where each packet has a life-threatening dose,”139 according to Stephen Traub, Robert 
Hoffman, and Lewis Nelson. Some individuals can swallow a total of 160 grams of 
cocaine in multiple balloons, estimated to be worth $50,000 to $100,000.140 However, 
Peter Reuter estimates the retail value of cocaine delivered per person to be around $1 
million, which is a huge profit for cartels.141 Mules can be used anywhere at any time 
with any method because most methods require the presence of a human operator. 
Despite the risk of getting caught, mules face the risk of rupturing the capsule that their 
drugs are in and in turn gamble with their lives. Additionally, it is much easier getting 
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caught as a mule because, according to Nathan Meehan, Michael McClary, and 
Christopher Strange, “it is possible for trained law enforcement to identify persons 
carrying illegal drugs that exhibit certain types of behaviors.”142 While some cartel 
members can hide these behaviors, others make it obvious to law enforcement that they 
are packing drugs.  
E. ESTIMATING COCAINE FLOWS THROUGH OVERLAND ROUTES 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) releases a world drug 
report annually in hopes to identify potential illicit drug profits as one result from the 
research.143 The report used 2014 data instead of 2015 data due to the later not being 
available as of yet and identified global cocaine production at 943 tons.144 According to 
the INCSR released by the U.S. Department of State, pure cocaine production estimates 
in 2014 was 310 tons in Colombia,145 225 tons in Bolivia,146 and 330 tons in Peru,147 
which is a total of 865 tons. In addition, 92 percent of global cocaine production is 
supplied by these three countries. For 2015, the INCSR reported that pure cocaine 
production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru was 1,100 tons, resulting in a 27 percent 
increase from 2014.148 Now that production estimates have been calculated, estimates for 
cocaine flow into the United States can be calculated. 
Estimating the amount of cocaine that flows from Colombia through Central 
America into the United States is difficult due to its illicit nature and the cartels’ ability to 
keep their operations clandestine and evade law enforcement detection. That said, in 
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2014, USCBP reported that a total of 4,534 pounds (2.26 tons) of cocaine was seized,149 
which is .26 percent of total pure cocaine produced by Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. 
Suppose 10 percent of the original 865 tons of cocaine, 86.5 tons, was successfully 
smuggled into the United States. With the example of a seizure of 2.26 tons, USCBP 
would still have only seized 2.6 percent of drugs smuggled into the United States. While 
USCBP is vigilant and determined to interdict drug smuggling operations, it is still not 
seizing a fraction of what cartels are smuggling into the United States.  
A global cocaine market report released by the UNODC was able to provide the 
amount of cocaine flowing across the border. According to the report, “Mexican cartels 
moved some 191 metric tons of pure cocaine across the border to the United States in 
2008.”150 The INCSR shows that for 2008, pure cocaine production was 720 metric 
tons,151 which means that 26.5 percent of pure cocaine production made it into the 
United States. Additionally, the cocaine market report identified 191 metric tons of 
cocaine as worth potentially $6.4 billion in the United States; however, with seizures, the 
wholesale price was brought down to $5.8 billion.152 The report stated, “the difference 
between the wholesale purchase price and the retail value of cocaine in the United States 
was US$29.5 billion in 2008.”153 While Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru all helped generate 
720 metric tons in 2008, “90 percent of the cocaine entering the country crosses the US/
Mexico land border.”154 By that calculation, 171.9 metric tons of cocaine originated in 
Colombia and crossed the land border in 2008. 
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F. ANALYSIS 
Table 1 represents my analysis when comparing methods of drug smuggling to 
domestic law enforcement, U.S. law enforcement, estimated costs/risks, benefits, and 
finally, their ranking compared to each other. When determining domestic law 
enforcement risks, I ranked them as low because Mexico, like all Central American 
countries, “are contending with personnel constraints, assigning other missions to 
military forces, and seize less than 2% of cocaine that transits through the country.”155 
Law enforcement is not willing to chase cocaine that enters its respective country; 
therefore, I determine that domestic enforcement risks are minimal.  
Table 1.   Rating of Land Methods 
  Method 
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U.S. law enforcement concerning drug smuggling by cars is low and somewhat 
medium for big rigs because law enforcement cannot pull over every car into a secondary 
inspection area due to resource constraints and the enormous number of vehicles that 
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cross the border daily. Additionally, USCBP has technology that can allow officers to 
quickly scan the vehicle and continue on to the next, which is beneficial for cartels 
because quick inspections hinder USCBP’s thoroughness and accuracy in detecting 
drugs. Tunnels are rated very low because of their secretive nature. The National Drug 
Threat Assessment (NDTA) reported that as of March 2016, 224 tunnels have been 
uncovered on the southwest border since 1990.156 Despite this, there are undeniably 
more tunnels that have not been uncovered yet by law enforcement or that were 
uncovered after cartels had already used them to transport drugs across the border. 
Cartels have endless resources that could allow them to work on multiple tunnels at a 
time. Mules are rated at very high due to better physical inspections by law enforcement 
and due to specialized training law enforcement has to locate and identify suspicious 
individuals who could possibly be body packing. 
The estimated costs to risks is rated low for cars because cars are relatively 
inexpensive, and they are likely to pass through ports of entry into the United States 
undetected. Big rigs pose a bigger risk than cars due to their larger sizes; however, they 
are still rated at low-medium due to the inability of law enforcement to inspect every big 
rig. Tunnels are also rated at low-medium due to their history of being uncovered, but the 
expenditures to build a tunnel are significantly less than what it can transport across the 
border. Mules and body packers are rated medium because it is extremely risky for the 
individual carrying the illicit drugs as compared to the small amount they can actually 
carry on their person. 
The benefits of cars and trucks are rated low to medium because just one 
successfully crossing the border does not yield as much profit as hundreds of vehicles 
crossing the border successfully with drugs. Benefits of tunnels is very high because if 
law enforcement does not uncover the tunnel, the potential profit is endless. Once a 
tunnel is open to business, cartels can send through as much product as they want and as 
often as they want. The benefits of mules or body packers is very low because the human 
body is limited to the amount of drugs it can carry. To gain a significant profit, hundreds, 
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if not thousands, of human smugglers must be successful in smuggling and in removing 
the drugs from their body. Overall, I have determined that tunnels have the best cost-
benefit ranking, while mules or body packers have the worst ranking. 
What does the determinations in Table 1 mean for cartels? It provides a 
reasonable explanation for which methods will be the most beneficial for cartels to use 
while smuggling overland. In this case, tunnels, big rigs, and personal vehicles are the 
most beneficial, and mules are the least beneficial due to the human body’s limitations. 
For example, suppose cartels smuggled similar volumes of drugs for tunnels, big rigs, 
vehicles, and mules. In 2016, the BBC News reported that “in the latest incident about 
1,016 kg of cocaine and 6,350 kg of marijuana suspected of being transported through a 
tunnel was seized.”157 While a tunnel can transport over 1,000 kg of cocaine in one 
operation, it would take approximately 18 big rigs, 59 personal vehicles, or 1,000 
individuals to transport the same amount. This means that there are more chances of drug 
busts using big rigs, personal vehicles, or mules than tunnels, assuming tunnels remain 
hidden from authorities. The method that would cost the least to get drugs across the 
border and yet have the greatest success is tunnels, followed by personal vehicles, big 
rigs, and then mules. If there were multiple tunnels operating at the same time, 
transporting over 1,000 kg of cocaine per operation, the profits could potentially become 
endless, which is why this method is the best for cartels to use, even if there are risks. 
While there are risks for each method, building a tunnel on Mexico’s side of the border is 
easy due to corruption and weak law enforcement.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Tracking the flow of cocaine from Central American into the United States 
continues to puzzle many scholars, congressional researchers, and military personnel. 
While there are estimates for 2008 cocaine flow into the United States, no recent data has 
been collected that provides this information, which causes issues when calculating flows 
and prices. There are multiple reasons, such as geographical location, corruption, limited 
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law enforcement, that contribute to the success of drug flow over land. Cartels are more 
likely to use tunnels first, trucks or personal vehicles second, and mules or body packers 
third when determining how efficient or inefficient law enforcement may be. 
USCBP’s effectiveness in countering drug smuggling operations is crucial to the 
security of the United States. This is because, just like the USCG is the first line of 
defense for the United States’ territorial waters, USCBP is the first line of defense for the 
United States’ border with Mexico. It is “one of the world’s largest law enforcement 
organizations charged with border security, management, and control.”158 The factors 
that contribute to overall cartel success may include but are not limited to porous portions 
and unpatrolled sections of the U.S.-Mexico border allowing cartels to use them as 
penetration points, advancements in technology, limited number of patrol agents along 
the 1900-mile border, and the cartels’ ability to adapt to the ever-changing environment 
and enforcement. Drug smuggling has always been, and continues to be, a game of cat 
and mouse. 
The next chapter focuses on the sea domain of drug smuggling. In it, I discuss the 
roles of military and law enforcement; historical and current methods and techniques 
cartels use in the maritime domain; the costs and benefits of maritime smuggling, 
estimation of cocaine flow through maritime routes; and an analysis of the methods used 
by cartels compared to law enforcement, risks, and costs. 
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III. THE SEA DOMAIN OF DRUG SMUGGLING 
Improvised submarines used by cartels have become an example of the future of 
drug smuggling. The USCG has been involved in many counter drug smuggling 
operations. Yet, according to a New York Times article, Rear Admiral Charles Michel 
stated, “my staff watches multi-ton loads go by,”159 which is “simply because there are 
not enough ships and aircraft available for the missions.”160 Vessels that are typically 
tracked by the USCG are  
semi-submersible, low-slung, diesel-propelled vessels, painted a dark 
shade to blend with the water capable of carrying several tons of cocaine; 
fully submersible vessels that would only surface at night capable of 
hauling 10 tons of cocaine and could sail beneath the surface all the way 
from Ecuador to Los Angeles; and fast boats, the high-powered fishing 
and leisure boats that can carry about a ton of cocaine.161  
The vessel detected in the article was “only a semi-submersible which has a range of 
about 3,000 miles.”162 After being detected, the crew of the semi-submersible “scuttled 
the vessel and abandoned ship, and the Coast Guard was able to salvage only two 66-
pound bales of narcotics.”163 What seems like a big win for the USCG is merely a small 
infraction in a cartels organization. 
The ocean is difficult to navigate let alone search for illicit activity. This is 
because the ocean has such a vast, ever-changing environment, making it impossible for 
law enforcement to solely focus on one mission. Why do cartels choose to smuggle 
across such precarious conditions? To answer this question, this chapter proceeds as 
follows. First, I discuss the effectiveness of the USCG and USN. Second, I elaborate a 
brief history of maritime drug smuggling that includes specific methods for smuggling 
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and means of transportation, as well as current methods of smuggling and means of 
transportation. Third, I provide a cost-benefit analysis of drug flow, using specific 
examples of transportation, such as semi-submersible narco submarines, panga go-fast 
boats, and cargo vessels. Fourth, I examine the estimations of cocaine flow through the 
maritime domain and the potential profits if the operation is successful. Finally, I create a 
table comparing each method and determine, which is best for cartels given lowest costs 
and highest benefits. 
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS: ORIGIN 
AND DESTINATION INSTITUTIONS 
According to Seelke et al., four Caribbean countries “have been identified as 
major drug-producing or drug-transit countries.”164 They are the Bahamas, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica.165 As Senators Feinstein and Grassley have 
noted, “because of their geographic location, large coastlines, and small criminal justice 
systems, Caribbean countries are uniquely vulnerable to drug trafficking.”166 Figure 5 
depicts how drugs travel from South America through, specifically, Jamaica, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas to the United States. However, these are not the 
only routes that drug smugglers may take; plenty more options and routes are available. 
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Figure 5.  Trafficking Routes through the Caribbean to the United States167 
In May 2010, the CBSI was formed with the intent of reducing illicit trafficking 
in the Caribbean.168 According to Feinstein and Grassley,  
CBSI funding has come from five foreign assistance accounts: 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); 
Economic Support Fund (ESF); Development Assistance (DA); 
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 
(NADR); and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).169  
Additionally, the senators reported that “the Department of Defense supports partner 
countries in the Caribbean through training, equipment, and information sharing.”170 
Seelke et al. posit that even with all of the funding, assistance, and support from the U.S. 
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government, “some policymakers in the region have concluded that the current U.S.-led 
counterdrug approach needs to be re-evaluated,”171 and that “the current U.S.-led 
international drug control regime, which has focused on criminalizing drug production 
and use, has largely failed.”172 Even though these countries remain on President 
Obama’s list in the Presidential Determination—Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit 
Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. institutions add to the presence of 
risk.173  
U.S. institutions present risk for maritime routes. Specifically, the USCG, which 
is responsible for  
guarding and protecting U.S. ports and waterways, 100,000 miles of 
coastline and inland waterways, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
encompassing 4.5 million square miles stretching from North of the Arctic 
Circle to South of the equator, from Puerto Rico to Guam, encompassing 
nine time zones—the largest EEZ in the world.174  
The USCG has a significantly smaller workforce when compared to the enormous 
territory for which it is responsible. While seizing drugs on the ocean is inevitable, it is 
impossible for it to keep all illicit drugs from entering the United States.175  
The USCG maintains approximately 88,000 employees with 40,992 active duty, 
7,000 reserve, 8,577 civilian, and 31,000 auxiliary.176 Some employees are scattered 
across the United States. The force laydown is as follows:  
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two geographic commands, the Atlantic Area and Pacific Area, are broken 
down into nine district command, which, in the Atlantic Area, includes 
five district commands covering the Eastern United States, the Atlantic 
Ocean, the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific Area, 
includes four district commands covering the Western United States and 
the Pacific Ocean.177  
Not only does the USCG assign personnel throughout the United States, it also deploys 
personnel to various regions around the world, including Central and South America, 
Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Far East Asia.178 According to the USCG, “the largest 
unit outside of the United States is Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA), which 
supported the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Operation Enduring Freedom.”179 
Additionally, also according to the USCG, “the Coast Guard also has personnel assigned 
to eight DOD Combatant Commands and often has a presence on all seven continents and 
the world’s oceans.”180 Countering drug smuggling operations is far from its only focus. 
Such a large footprint creates multiple roles and responsibilities for the USCG. It 
manages six major operational missions: “Maritime law enforcement, maritime response, 
maritime prevention, marine transportation system management, maritime security 
operations, and defense operations.”181 Furthermore, there are 11 missions which the six 
major operational missions oversee classified as either homeland security or non-
homeland security missions.182 Homeland security missions include “ports, waterways, 
and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other 
law enforcement.”183 In addition, non-homeland security missions include “marine 
safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine resources; marine 
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environmental protection; and [I]ce operations.”184 In order for USCG personnel to 
counter drug smuggling operations, drug smugglers basically need to fall into their laps 
as the smugglers are passing by, because the USCG must fit drug interdiction among all 
of its other responsibilities.  
The USN controls the globe with its dominance in sea power. Admiral John 
Richardson states, “Navy Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that American growth 
required access to overseas markets, which in turn required a preeminent navy to protect 
that access.”185 Admiral Richardson also goes on to say that “in an increasingly 
globalized world, America’s success is even more reliant on the U.S. Navy.”186 Without 
the access to vendors abroad, the United States’ economy would not be what it is today, 
which is one reason why it is important for the USN to be deployed around the world. 
The USN is broken down into five numbered fleets: 3rd fleet is part of the United 
States Pacific Fleet, located in San Diego, California; 4th fleet is part of 
USSOUTHCOM, located in Mayport, Florida; 5th fleet is part of the United States 
Central Command, located in Manama, Bahrain; 6th fleet is part of the United States 
European Command, located in Naples, Italy; and 7th fleet is also part of the United 
States Pacific Fleet, located in Yokosuka, Japan.187 The fleet that deals directly with drug 
smuggling routes into the United States from Central and South America, and the 
Caribbean is USSOUTHCOM. USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) 
“encompasses 31 countries, 16 dependencies, the land mass of Latin American south of 
Mexico, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, and the Caribbean Sea.”188 
Figure 6 depicts USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. 
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Figure 6.  USSOUTHCOM’s AOR189 
There are eight entities within USSOUTHCOM, but only one is directly 
responsible for counter drug smuggling operations, the Joint Interagency Task Force 
South (JIATFS).190 The JIATFS is the first line approach to countering drug smuggling 
operations. According to the Western Hemisphere Drug Interdiction Efforts, “the 
majority of illegal drugs flowing into the United States come from South America, and 
transit through the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific 
Ocean.”191 However, this single entity is not enough to patrol and control the seven 
million mile transit zone, in which there is an abundance of routes for drug smugglers to 
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avoid detection.192 The USN has the same problem as USCBP and the USCG; there are 
too many responsibilities and not enough funding, personnel, and assets to disrupt the 
drug smuggling organization. According to General Kelly, “the Coast Guard faces its 
own limitations, and an increase of an additional two to three cutters still puts us far 
below the 16 flight-deck equipped vessels required to conduct our detection and 
monitoring mission.”193 Along the same vein, Admiral Tidd explained, “for every 
additional ship and air asset we are able to dedicate to the detection and monitoring 
mission, we can disrupt approximately 20 more metric tons of cocaine.”194 Things may 
be headed that way, since General Kelly, former Commander, USSOUTHCOM and now 
DHS Secretary, and Admiral Tidd, Commander, USSOUTHCOM, are now working 
closely together. 
The bodies of water surrounding the United States, Central and South America, 
and the Caribbean Islands are guarded by the USCG, and USN. Both of these assets 
provide aircraft for surveillance, maritime vessels to patrol the high seas, and a wide 
range of personnel who train in specific mission sets. Due to budget constraints, there is a 
lack in overall success for maritime interdiction. The Deputy for Operations Policy and 
Capabilities of the USCG, Rear Admiral William D. Lee, said that “last year, our cutter 
and aircraft crews removed over 77 metric tons of cocaine and 35 tons of marijuana in the 
6-million-square-mile Transit Zone,”195 which “is a decrease of approximately 30 metric 
tons from fiscal year 2012, which is attributed, in part, to the reduction in aircraft and 
cutter patrol hours under sequestration.”196 The USCG, and USN are seizing drugs on the 
high seas, but lack of assets greatly affect their ability to increase drug interdiction. 
Cartels use the sea domain because detection is difficult, and even if they are tracked and 
identified by the USCG or USN, they usually have a contingency plan to keep from 
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getting caught. Additionally, cartels understand that the United States and partner nations 
are limited to their own funds and assets, and they exploit this weakness. 
B. HISTORICAL METHODS OF MARITIME SMUGGLING 
When cruise liners were the most common vessels for leisure transport in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, individuals who came home from overseas business trips or 
vacations would typically smuggle jewelry, cigars, and watches to avoid paying tariff.197 
According to Andreas, “virtually anything could be used as a smuggling device: trunks 
with false bottoms, and other hidden compartments, hollow canes and heels, and even 
infants and children.”198 While anything could have been used as a smuggling device, 
inspections at ports of entry were not as strict or detailed as they are today. As time went 
on, merchant vessels and cargo ships started to take over the economic ties between the 
United States and countries around the globe. As this happened, the least expensive and 
most reliable way of trade became the use of these merchant vessels and cargo ships. 
Sea trade has come a long way in the last century or so. The Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower reports that “ninety percent of world trade by volume travels 
across the oceans.”199 Additionally, according to Phelps, Daily, and Koenigsberg, “the 
U.S. in particular is dependent upon its sea lines of communication and attachment to a 
global market for its economic survival.”200 With several thousand cargo vessels and 
tankers worldwide containing nearly 3,000 containers per ship come endless possibilities 
for smugglers to hide their drugs.201 As the inventory for these type of ships continued to 
increase over the years, there is potential for cartels to use them as transportation for their 
illicit cargo. 
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C. THE BENEFITS OF CURRENT METHODS OF MARITIME 
SMUGGLING 
Smuggling drugs in frozen sharks, semi-submersible narcosubs, submarines, and 
what tends to look like legitimate produce are some examples of how cartels are 
becoming innovative with the way they conduct business on the high seas.202 Not only is 
there a significant chance that these methods remain undetected, there is also a chance 
that even if they may seem suspicious, inspectors may not conduct a thorough inspection 
and may let smugglers and their product pass through anyway. This game of cat and 
mouse comes down to one thing: who is luckier? Luck is the determining factor because, 
like Admiral Papp put it, “much like the weather and the seas we face on a daily basis, we 
cannot control the fiscal environment in which we operate.”203 Additionally, Admiral 
Papp argues, “the growing threat of small go-fast vessels that smugglers are using to 
avoid the increased security along the southwest U.S. border,”204 is an “increasing 
danger to our homeland.”205 It is unlikely that all methods of smuggling could be 
removed from the maritime domain because there are potentially so many due to the 
cartels’ persistence. Cartels may be motivated to convert from the land domain to the sea 
domain because of the endless route possibilities. 
The DEA has been uncovering underground tunnels leading from Mexico to the 
United States, which cause drug smugglers to alter their routes from land to sea to avoid 
detection. For example, by taking panga boats up to Big Sur, California, approximately 
500 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border, smugglers have been able to move drugs into 
the United States without being initially detected.206 According to Rahaim, “few people 
who make land in Big Sur ever get apprehended due to the extensive wilderness and 
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minimum law enforcement.”207 He also explained not only do “the pangas’ low profile 
and two high-horsepower engines make them hard to spot and speedy in case of 
pursuit,”208 but “they are common for local fisherman to use.”209 Figure 7 shows a panga 
go-fast boat with four powerful engines. 
 
Figure 7.  Panga Go-Fast Boat Containing Four Engines210 
In addition to panga boats, smugglers use cargo vessels and any other type of 
vessel they can get their hands on to move illicit drugs into the United States.211 
According to Lee Fang, a cargo vessel was stopped before exiting Colombian territorial 
waters, and when they searched it, authorities found 90 pounds of cocaine hidden in a 
locker.212 The cargo vessel, Ping May, which contained the cocaine, has ties back to U.S. 
Senator Mitch McConnell, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and his father-in-law James 
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Chao, “founder of the Foremost Maritime Corporation; a New York-based shipping, 
trading, and finance enterprise.”213 Senator McConnell’s wife is Elaine Chao, the 2017 
U.S. Secretary of Transportation. While this is only one specific case, there are probably 
more cases that either no one has knowledge of or that simply gets over looked due to 
corrupt officials willing to turn a blind eye for money. Cartels are willing to exploit 
corrupt officials and use large cargo vessels precisely because, if successful, these vessels 
produce an enormous profit. 
D. SEEING LIKE A CARTEL: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
MARITIME SMUGGLING 
While there are many types of vessels, there are only a few different types of 
vessels that cartels utilize when smuggling drugs via the maritime domain. In the past, 
these vessels may have been limited in their ability to navigate, remain hidden from law 
enforcement, and lack speed. However, improvements, and advancements in technology 
have made cartels’ job easier because now most vessels are equipped with current global 
positioning systems, as well as powerful engines, and are built stealthily to remain 
undetected. With these improvements, cartels continue to see their drugs successfully 
entering the United States, resulting in a continuous influx of profit. 
1. Profit on the Horizon? 
Semi-submersibles are commonly used by cartels because the top of the vessel is 
situated a few inches below the surface of the water, allowing them to go undetected.214 
Some vessels recently seized can transport up to 7.5 tons of cocaine;215 and, if needed, 
the operators can abandon the craft and sink it so that there is no incriminating evidence. 
Wholesale value of 7.5 tons of cocaine would be $405 million. A Vice News article 
stated, “A report by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) found that, in 
2012, 80 percent of illicit drugs smuggled into the U.S. came via maritime routes, of 
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which 30 percent were found to have been smuggled in narco-subs.”216 Additionally, a 
news article from the Business Insider reported that “one in four of the vessels are 
interdicted.”217 In this case, if we take data from the Foreign Military Studies Office in 
2012, where 214 narco submarine events were documented, but only 45 were interdicted, 
the one in four seizure ratio is proven correct.218 However, while these were documented 
events, there could potentially have been more vessels that went undetected. 
Suppose 214 documented narco submarine events doubled from 2012 to 2017, in 
which case there would be 428 narco submarine events. Therefore, in this case, 107 
vessels would be interdicted while 321 vessels would be undetected. Assuming this, the 
wholesale value that is brought into the United States by cartels is around $130 billion. 
However, the profit increases when drugs are sold at retail value. The major risks that are 
associated with moving drugs via semi-submersible are: potential break down of said 
submersible, potential interdiction from the USCG, USN or international countries, and 
potential navigation failure causing the smuggling operation to end in a different location. 
Even with all of these risks, cartels are willing to pursue this option due to low 
expenditures that yield vast profits. Figure 8 shows a semi-submersible narco sub being 
boarded by the USCG. 
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Figure 8.  Semi-submersible Boarded by the United States Coast Guard219 
2. Fast Boats and Fast Profits 
Go-fast boats have been a common method of smuggling because they are 
propelled by extremely powerful engines, they are very small and hard to detect on radar, 
and they can carry upwards of 2,000 pounds of drugs.220 From November 2016 to 
January 2017, the USCG seized approximately 13 tons of cocaine from 21 separate 
interdiction operations.221 Additionally, a 2017 Coast Guard News article reports that 
“During Fiscal Year 2016, the United States Coast Guard seized more than 416,600 
pounds of cocaine and taken 585 suspected smugglers into custody from the Eastern 
Pacific.”222 While the USCG may have seized 416,600 pounds of cocaine, this is only a 
fraction of what cartels attempt to bring into the United States, and it has only disrupted a 
minimal amount of cartel profit. 
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For the sake of an example, suppose every time the USCG interdicts a panga go-
fast boat, there is approximately 2,000 pounds of cocaine onboard. If the USCG 
interdicted 416,600 pounds of cocaine in 2016, then it interdicted around 208 panga go-
fast boats, which is close to the number of pangas seized or spotted in fiscal year 2012 
and 2013.223 As the number increased from 204 in 2012 to 231 in 2013, suppose 
approximately 40 pangas were successful in their clandestine operations. While 2,000 
pounds of cocaine on one panga goes for $54 million, 80,000 pounds of cocaine from the 
successful pangas would go for $2.1 billion. As one can see, there is still an enormous 
potential for cartels to generate a profit, even if a huge percent of their pangas are seized. 
However, it is still hard to calculate how many are successful because law enforcement 
does not know what it does not get. 
3. What is in the Box? Container Shipments and Drug Trafficking 
Container vessels are some of the largest vessels transiting the ocean to conduct 
international trade. Without container vessels, economies around the world would not be 
as sufficient as they are today. According to Frittelli, “The estimated world inventory of 
containers is about 12 million, 9 million of which enter U.S. sea ports each year.”224 He 
also goes on to say that “Unlike other cargo ships whose loading process occurs at the 
port…container ships carry cargo from hundreds of companies and the containers are 
loaded away from the port at individual company warehouses,”225 and “with each 
transfer of the container from one party to the next is a point of vulnerability in the 
supply chain.”226 Loading the containers away from the port is an incentive for cartels to 
take the risk. In addition to containers, according to McNicholas, “The insides of cargo 
bays, ventilation shafts, crawl spaces, rope and storage lockers, engine room, 
accommodations, supply closets, life boats, etc., provide an almost infinite number of 
places to hide a box or duffle bags containing kilos of drugs.”227  
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For an illustrative case, suppose out of nine million containers that enter the 
United States every year,228 only .1 percent of those containers were used to smuggle 
drugs, or nearly 9,000. Further suppose that of the 9,000 containers that are used in an 
attempt to smuggle drugs, only 1 percent (or 90 containers) were successful. If some 
containers onboard vessels are known for carrying two tons of drugs,229 totaling $108 
million, then the total amount that 90 containers can carry would be worth $9.7 billion. 
While this seems like an unrealistic profit, it actually can be viewed as perfectly realistic 
because, according to Wasem et al., “In terms of customs inspections, approximately 
5.2% of sea containers entering the United States were physically inspected in 2004, up 
from 2%.”230 One can assume that since 2004, sea container inspections have increased. 
However, inspections can only increase so much due to resource constraints and 
schedules that are necessary to keep the economy flowing. 
E. ESTIMATING COCAINE FLOW THROUGH MARITIME ROUTES 
With reference back to Chapter II, assuming that 90 percent, or 171.9 metric tons, 
of smuggled cocaine crossed the land border into the United States in 2008, then only 
19.1 tons, or 38,000 pounds, of cocaine was brought in by sea. By 2012, almost 80 
percent of illicit drugs entering the United States came via maritime routes,231 which 
means if it is assumed that the same amount, 191 metric tons, entered the United States in 
2012, then 152.8 tons, or 316,000 pounds, of cocaine entered by sea. In 2016, Office of 
Inspector General released the Review of U.S. Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2015 Drug 
Control Performance Summary Report , reported that in fiscal year 2012, the USCG 
removed approximately 107 metric tons of cocaine out of potentially 796 metric tons of 
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cocaine flow, resulting in a 13.4 percent removal rate.232 While a 13.4 percent removal 
rate does not seem like a large amount, in fiscal year 2015, the USCG removed 144.8 
metric tons of cocaine out of 1254 potential flow, resulting in a smaller removal rate of 
11.5 percent.233 Removal rates fluctuate from year to year, but the rates show that the 
USCG only removes a fraction of cocaine that enters the United States. 
F. ANALYSIS 
Table 2 represents my analysis comparing at sea methods of drug smuggling to 
domestic law enforcement, U.S. law enforcement, estimated costs to risks, benefits, and 
finally, their ranking against each other. I rated semi-submersible narco subs as medium 
when compared to domestic law enforcement risks because not only does the USCG 
seize them, but the Colombian military does as well. According to Byron Ramirez and 
Robert Bunker, “narco-submarines and related maritime drug trafficking methods are 
being carried out with relative impunity, with only about 1 in 4 craft presently being 
interdicted.”234 They go on to report that approximately 82 narco-subs have been seized 
since 2013.235 If 82 narco-subs have been seized, and only one in four are usually 
interdicted, then there were possibly 244 total narco-subs identified. Panga go-fast boats 
are rated as low because their small size helps them avoid radar detection, they travel 
faster than most other vessels, and they blend in well with other small maritime vessels, 
such as fishing vessels. Container vessels are also rated as low because there are 
thousands of them on the ocean, and it is hard to inspect every single one. However, this 
does not mean that law enforcement gets lucky once in a while and boards a vessel that is 
being used to smuggle drugs.  
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Table 2.   Rating of Sea Methods 
















Low-Medium Low-Medium Low 
Estimated 
Costs/Risks 
Medium Low-Medium Medium-Low 




Second Best Best Worst 
 
U.S. law enforcement slightly mirrors domestic law enforcement in regard to 
ratings. I rated narco subs as low to medium because one of the USCG and USN’s 
mission is to interdict drug smuggling operations, and it is somewhat successful in doing 
such. However, even though they do interdict some narco subs, there are inevitably others 
that make it to the United States. I rated go-fast boats as low to medium also for the same 
reasons as the narco subs. I rated container vessels as low because it is impossible for 
customs inspectors to inspect every vessel that comes through a port of entry into the 
United States. Additionally, unless the USCG or USN gets intelligence that a container 
vessel has loaded drugs onto the vessel, they may never know exactly what is on the 
vessel. 
Determining the estimated costs to risks takes into account the expenditures that 
cartels must endure and the risks law enforcement pose on drug smuggling operations. I 
rated narco subs as medium because cartels spend anywhere from $1 million to $2 
million building narco subs and lose one in four to law enforcement. If cartels send 20 
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narco subs, and five are seized, they would end up losing anywhere from $5 million to 
$10 million. However, it would be estimated that 15 narco subs would be successful and 
transport drugs to the United States, which would result in a higher profit.  
I rated go-fast boats as low to medium because these types of boats are fairly easy 
to build and the only expenditure cartels would have to endure is the engines that propel 
the boats, which could add to tens of thousands of dollars. However, law enforcement is 
known for seizing these types of boats, therefore using this type of boat poses somewhat 
of a risk to cartels’ operations. However, if successful, go-fast boats could generate a 
bold profit.  
I rated container vessels as medium to low because cartels must rely on 
companies to move illicit containers on and off the container vessel, while also risking 
inconsistencies in inventory paperwork. Law enforcement has been known to seize drugs 
on container vessels. However, the security and control over these vessels is improving; 
therefore, they pose an even greater risk if cartels use them. 
Using either of these methods can potentially benefit cartels. However, if 
successful, use of narco subs has the highest potential to generate profits for cartels, while 
container vessels have the lowest potential. I rated the narco sub as high because if 
successful, they can benefit the cartels the most by generating the most profit. It has 
already been stated that narco subs can transport multi-ton loads of drugs and when 
combined with other successful narco subs, they can generate profits in the billions. I 
rated go-fast boats as medium because their benefit is not as high as narco subs. Unlike 
narco subs, go-fast boats cannot transport as much, but they still generate a profit in the 
hundreds of millions. Finally, I rated container vessels as low because, even though 
container vessels could generate a large profit, cartels may not take the risk of not being 
able to directly control their drugs. Meaning that container vessels have become more 
closely monitored and are controlled by the captain and ship’s crew, and unless the price 
is right, corruption on a container vessel may be limited. 
After rating these methods, it is important to rank them appropriately. I ranked 
panga go-fast boats as best, narco subs as second best, and container vessels as worst. 
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While container vessels may seem like a prime target for cartels, I ranked them as worst 
because it seems unrealistic for cartels to put their drugs at risk on vessels that they 
cannot control. Narco subs seem like the obvious choice for ranking them as the best; 
however, I ranked them second best because they are not as fast as go-fast boats. If they 
need to evade law enforcement, their only option is to scuttle the craft and abandon ship, 
which means cartels would lose one to two million for building the sub, millions in drug 
profit, and potential detainment of the smugglers who could provide law enforcement 
with information on the cartels’ operations. I ranked go-fast boats as best because they 
are low profile vessels that are hard to detect on radar, have powerful engines that will 
allow them to outrun law enforcement, and are inexpensive to operate. Additionally, 
these boats can carry drugs that have an estimated worth in the millions, and can be easily 
and quickly offloaded once ashore.  
What does Table 2 mean for cartels? It provides a reasonable explanation in 
determining which methods are the most beneficial for cartels to use while smuggling on 
the ocean. In this case, panga go-fast boats, and semi-submersible narco subs are the most 
beneficial, while container vessels are the least beneficial due to legitimate scrutiny they 
must go through when entering port. Suppose cartels smuggled similar volumes of drugs 
using these three methods. In 2016, Fox News reported, “a Northern California U.S. 
Coast Guard crew seized more than 6 tons of cocaine from a semi-submersible 
vessel.”236 While a semi-submersible narco sub can transport over six tons of cocaine in 
one operation, it would take approximately three container vessels, or six panga go-fast 
boats to transport the same amount. This means that there are more chances of drug busts 
against container vessels or panga go-fast boats than semi-submersible narco subs. 
However, narco subs are limited in number due to ongoing seizures both in Colombia and 
on the ocean by law enforcement. The method in which it would cost the least to get 
drugs across the border but have the greatest success would be panga go-fast boats 
because they are inexpensive or could be built by cartels, and they can offload drugs at 
any point of entry into the United States. However, some pangas do get seized by law 
                                                 




enforcement. There are numerous more small boats than container vessels or semi-
submersibles which blend into legitimate traffic creating a headache for law enforcement 
personnel when they are trying to detect suspicious small boats.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The vessels discussed earlier are and continue to be the most common sea going 
methods cartels use in their drug smuggling operations. Even so, there is no doubt that 
cartels will use any vessel they can get their hands on. The problem with estimating the 
flow of drugs through the maritime domain is that cartels may not stick to a maritime 
route for the entire transit. Meaning that cartels can alter back and forth from maritime 
routes to land routes. What determines whether cartels will use land or maritime routes 
depends on several factors, such as terrain or natural barriers that prevent vessels from 
getting where they need to go, law enforcement presence on land or sea, corrupt 
governments, or weather. Additionally, cartels can alter routes as quickly as necessary, 
resulting in variation from year to year.  
There are endless opportunities for cartels on the open ocean because the ocean is 
too large for law enforcement to control, unlike the smaller (in comparison) U.S.-Mexico 
land border. Additionally, law enforcement may not be able to control the air domain; 
however, air traffic controllers, who use radar, and air marshals have improved their 
ability to identify, detect, and track suspicious aircraft. The next chapter focuses on the 
air domain. Specifically, I discuss the role and responsibility of the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), historical and current methods and techniques cartels use 
in the air domain, the costs and benefits of air smuggling, estimating cocaine flow 
through air routes, and an analysis of the methods used by cartels compared to law 
enforcement, risks, and costs.  
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IV. THE AIR DOMAIN OF DRUG SMUGGLING 
In October 2016, a grandmother was arrested in Detroit and charged with 
“sneaking $500,000 worth of cocaine onto a Detroit-bound plane from Las Vegas and 
then trying to deliver the coke after landing.”237 According to the news report, the 63-
year old woman “was acting suspicious and alerted federal drug agents, who arrived and 
set up surveillance.”238 Additionally, according to an article in the Detroit Free Press, 
“They saw her looking at the tags on several pieces of luggage on the 
carousel….eventually, she picked up two large suitcases and headed for the taxi 
stand.”239 Eventually, authorities pulled her over and a police K9 sniffed out the drugs.240 
The woman “tucked eight bundles of cocaine wrapped in plastic in one suitcase and nine 
in the other, which estimated to be about 17 kilos.”241 This example shows the cartels’ 
willingness to target senior citizens as mules.  
While the incident in Detroit was fairly recent, airport security increased many 
years earlier. After 9/11, airport security increased and tightened its grasp on all travelers 
throughout the United States. With increased security came longer inspection lines, better 
technology to identify and detect contraband (including drugs), and random anti-
terrorism measures. Random anti-terrorism measures do not single out a specific 
individual but randomly select individuals for further inspection. These are necessary 
because they keep bad people, including drug smugglers, from being able to guess when 
a secondary inspection will be, which would result in the bad person being able to avoid 
inspection. Security measures at airports have become overly strict; however, the 
strictness is necessary to prevent drug smugglers from entering the country. 
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The air domain, just like the sea domain, is enormous and hard to control; 
however, the United States does its best with what it has available. Why do cartels insist 
on smuggling drugs in a fairly secure domain, especially after 9/11 and tightened 
security? To answer this question, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the 
effectiveness of the TSA. Second, I elaborate a brief history of air drug smuggling, which 
includes specific methods and techniques, as well as current methods and techniques 
cartels use to smuggle in this domain. Third, I provide a cost-benefit analysis of drug 
flow using specific examples of transportation, such as ultralight aircraft, drones, and 
private jets. Fourth, I examine the estimations of cocaine flow through the air domain, 
and the potential profits if cartels are successful. Finally, I provide a table showing which 
method of smuggling is most beneficial to the cartel and which one is the most profitable. 
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT IN THE AIR: ORIGIN AND 
DESTINATION INSTITUTIONS 
Several countries in Central America and the Caribbean are potential hub stations 
for cartels to exploit. According to a 2010 AZCentral news report, “Long range flights 
from Colombia to areas in northern Mexico are gone because they raise too much 
suspicion on radar.”242 Now, traffickers use “short-distance aerial trafficking to transport 
cocaine from South America to Mexico.”243 Additionally, “As U.S. counternarcotic 
cooperation with Venezuela has diminished…. The Bahamas continues to serve as a 
major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South American cocaine.”244 Even 
though Caribbean countries can still be used as transit points for cartels, cartels are 
finding themselves using the Central American corridor more and more as their primary 
transit zone.245 However, determining where and how cartels transport their drugs 
remains difficult due to their ability to adapt and quickly change routes or means of 
transportation. 
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In addition to the risks associated with transitioning drugs through Central 
American and Caribbean countries, U.S. institutions, specifically, the TSA and the Air 
and Marine Operations (AMO) department within USCBP, present risk for using air 
routes for drug smuggling. TSA became stricter after 9/11. For example, according to 
TSA, in November 2001, “President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act into law requiring screening conducted by federal officials, 100 percent 
checked baggage screening, expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service and reinforced 
cockpit doors.”246 Security measures continued to increase as additional threats were 
identified. For instance, according to TSA’s website, in September 2006, “TSA enhances 
security measures to include more random screening of employees, additional canine 
patrols, stronger air cargo security measures, more rigorous identity verification standards 
and deploying more trained security officers in observation techniques.”247 Security 
measures increased again in 2008 when “TSA increased its canine use to screen 100 
percent of air cargo loaded onto U.S. passenger aircraft,”248 and by 2014, “TSA made 
numerous operation enhancements to advanced imaging technology to complement 
technologies already in use.”249 These past developments and improvements have created 
a deterrence shield around commercial aircraft and airports.  
AMO, a department that falls under the USCBP, is responsible for “securing 
America’s borders and carries out an important and related Homeland Security mission, 
fulfilled with partner agencies, to secure America’s national airspace.”250 AMO agents 
“exercise legal authorities under federal law…with respect to inspection of GA airman 
and medical certificates, photo identification, and aircraft certificates of registration.”251 
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The Office of Air and Marine stated its roles and responsibilities in two plans, as 
explained in the following: 
the Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan (ADSII) and 
the Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan (AOTR), identify CBP 
responsibilities with respect to domestic aviation security. The AOTR 
specifies that the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is responsible for conducting 
aviation law enforcement operations, including detecting, identifying, and 
interdicting potential air threats to national security, as well as investigative 
case support for prosecution of criminal law violations within its 
jurisdiction. The ADSII specifies that CBP is responsible for detecting and 
identifying potential air threats to the United States, including aircraft 
involved in the aerial transit of contraband in the United States.252  
In addition to these plans, USCBP has utilized aircraft and advanced surveillance 
technology to prevent aircraft from smuggling drugs into the United States. 
Several upgrades and new additions of useful technology assist USCBP with 
identifying, detecting, and tracking, ultimately leading to interdiction operations. 
According to Alles, Borkowski, and Vitiello, “the Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft 
(MEA) has a multi-mode radar for use over water and land, an electro-optical/infrared 
camera system, and a satellite communications system that is highly capable and a critical 
investment in CBP’s maritime, land, and aerial surveillance capabilities.”253 There are 
approximately 240 aircraft in the AMO inventory,254 which include: “P-3 Long Range 
Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, DHC-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, AS-350 
helicopter, and various Unmanned Aerial Systems.”255 In addition to these assets, CBP 
reported that “full operations of eight helium-filled balloon surveillance systems will 
provide radar coverage of the U.S./Mexico border, south Florida and Puerto Rico 
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areas.”256 USCBP’s AMO Center uses “these powerful surveillance tools to provide 
border monitoring and enforcement of low-level aircraft.”257 
B. HISTORICAL METHODS OF AIR SMUGGLING 
Since the 1970s, small aircraft have been used by cartels to transport drugs from 
Colombia to the Bahamas.258 According to Andreas, “Carlos Lehder Rivas is credited 
with pioneering the transportation of cocaine through the Caribbean to the United States 
by small aircraft.”259 Exploiting the Bahamas was easy because “government authorities 
in Nassau were suspected of taking hefty bribes to look the other way.”260 Decker and 
Chapman explained that many smugglers they spoke to “identified a strip on the Guajira 
Peninsula controlled by drug traffickers and often used by planes departing with 
drugs.”261 They also explained that these airplanes “would drop a load or land in such 
countries as the Bahamas, Cuba, Aruba, Haiti, Honduras, and Puerto Rica.”262 The 
Bahamas seem to be a cartels’ favorite transit point because  
they are made up of more than seven hundred islands, half of which are 
uninhabited; it is as difficult for Bahamian officials to patrol these islands 
as it is for U.S. law enforcement to follow a smuggler through the islands 
during a chase; the islands are only forty miles from Miami, which makes 
travel in all types of boats feasible; and corruption on the island allows for 
the purchase of flight plans and for landing planes from Colombia, making 
the transfer of loads more secure.263  
The Bahamas were not the only countries in the Caribbean that were favored by the cartels. 
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Cuba was a significant transit point for cartels to use when smuggling drugs on 
aircraft. Some smugglers told Decker and Chapman that “the government could be paid 
off and U.S. law enforcement could not enter the flight zone around it.”264 The smugglers 
also explained to the authors that “first the plane would fly over Cuba to let officials 
know it was there, and then the smugglers would airdrop the load off the coast of Cuba 
for boats that would bring it to Florida.”265 Additional transit points were “Puerto Rico, 
Mexico, Haiti, Jamaica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic because of the 
possibilities for corruption and payoffs for information.”266 The reason why it was 
necessary to have multiple options of transit points was because “direct flights from 
Colombia to the United States are impossible for many aircraft and require so much fuel 
for others that the amount of cocaine that can be carried is minimal.”267 Once an airplane 
successfully makes it to a transit point, cartels must then transport drugs by either the 
same airplane or a different airplane into the United States. According to Filippone, this 
“is the most dangerous part of the operation due to the emphasis on interdiction by U.S. 
law enforcement agencies, and for this reason the cocaine acquires most of its value 
here.”268 Cartels are able to succeed in their operations due to their sophisticated 
aircrafts, as well as being able to infiltrate U.S. armed forces communication systems that 
will tell the cartel movements of these forces.269 Historical methods of smuggling by air 
reveal that cartels were using the Caribbean more often than Central America for a while; 
however, current methods show that cartels are using Central America more often and are 
also incorporating drones into their methods of transportation. 
C. THE BENEFITS OF CURRENT METHODS OF AIR SMUGGLING 
Cartels continue to use the Caribbean as a major transit point for smuggling drugs 
into the United States. However, according to Seelke et al., “The overwhelming use of 
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the Central America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone represents a major shift in 
trafficking routes; the primary pathways today for illegal drugs entering the United States 
from abroad is through the Central America-Mexico corridor.”270 Figure 9 depicts routes 
that cartels have used, since 2010, to smuggle drugs to a staging point before proceeding 
north to the United States. Additionally, Figure 9 shows how cartels are no longer 
primarily using the Caribbean, 30 percent of total use, but are mostly using the Central 
America-Mexico corridor, 70 percent of total use. 
 
Figure 9.  USSOUTHCOM: Suspected Routes of Drug Smuggling Aircraft271 
In addition to small aircraft, cartels have been testing and utilizing drone 
technology. Alternatively known as unmanned aerial vehicles, drones can be small and 
lightweight, and some can even be completely undetectable on radar. The military uses 
drones in a variety of mission sets, but recently drones have become more popular with 
civilian users. If someone wants to buy a drone and use it for smuggling drugs across the 
border, all one needs to do is go to BestBuy or online to Amazon and order one. In 
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January 2015, the New York Times reported that a drone crash landed on the lawn of the 
White House.272  
It is not just civilian users that have been using drones. In January 2015, CNN 
reported that smugglers used a drone to transport approximately six pounds of crystal 
meth from Mexico to the United States, but the operation failed when the drone went 
down because of the weight of the payload and landed in a parking lot in Tijuana, 
Mexico.273 Six pounds of crystal meth goes for approximately $48,000 in the United 
States.274  
D. SEEING LIKE A CARTEL: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIR 
SMUGGLING 
Cartels are limited with the type of aircraft they can use to smuggle drugs. 
However, this limitation does not pose any risks to cartels because the countries they are 
flying their drugs into are notoriously corrupt or have weak law enforcement capabilities. 
The most common modes of transportation cartels use to smuggle their drugs is by 
ultralight aircraft, drones, or private jets. Cartels may continue to hide their drugs on 
private jets either by human packing, in personal luggage, or in cargo. However, it is 
impossible for cartels to hide drugs on ultralight aircraft or drones due to their small 
nature; only relatively small amounts can be transported this way. Additionally, cartels 
intend to offload drugs immediately after landing, or the pilot drops the drugs and returns 
to base. Even though law enforcement agencies are sometimes successful in interdicting 
suspicious aircraft, they will never interdict 100 percent of the aircraft that are used to 
smuggle drugs. 
1. Invasion of the Ultralight 
Cartels will do anything to transport drugs from Mexico into the United States, 
including experimenting with new technologies such as ultralights. Ultralight aircraft 
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have become a common method for avoiding checkpoints at ports of entry into the United 
States. Steven Luke explain that these aircraft “are like gliders, but with engines and the 
pilots are seated.”275 The operation is simple, the pilot flies the ultralight across the 
border, drops the package of drugs from the aircraft, and simply flies back across the 
border to Mexico to avoid incarceration.276 Luke states, “the pilots fly at night to avoid 
detection and carry hundreds of pounds of drugs in a basket-type contraption beneath the 
aircraft.”277 Ultralight aircraft may pose risks to cartels when using them because 
sometimes they can crash and kill the pilot if the load of drugs is too heavy.278 
Alternatively, if the pilot successfully drops the package, law enforcement may get to the 
location of the package before the cartel member receiving the package does.279 Figure 
10 depicts what an ultralight aircraft looks like after crashing due to heavy loads of drugs. 
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Figure 10.  Downed Ultralight Aircraft Carrying Drugs280 
If someone wants to purchase an ultralight aircraft, all he or she would need to do 
is go to EBay and bid for one. Prices for ultralight aircraft vary anywhere from a couple 
thousand dollars to tens of thousands of dollars, depending on the quality and with what 
the craft is equipped. Ultimately, these aircraft are relatively cheap when compared to the 
profit cartels generate after one airdrop. The USCBP released a news report that revealed 
“an ultralight aircraft dropped several bundles of marijuana, weighing approximately 219 
pounds with an estimated worth of $109,500.”281 According to Senator Kamala Harris, 
“Since 2008, there have been more than 200 incidents involving ultra-lights.”282 For the 
sake of speculation, suppose at least 200 ultralight aircrafts have been successful, and 
each dropped $109,500 worth of drugs into the United States. The result would have been 
$21.9 million in potential revenue for cartels. Since we do not know how many 
undetected ultralight aircrafts have been successful, it is hard to determine the potential 
profit for cartels when using said aircrafts. However, it may be safe to say that cartels can 
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generate a revenue of hundreds of millions of dollars due to the number of identified 
ultralight aircrafts. 
2. Drones: Vehicles of the Future? Or Short Lived Test Platform? 
Commonly known as unmanned aerial vehicles, drones have become popular in 
cartel operations. For example, as reported in the Los Angeles Times, in early 2015, “28 
pounds of heroin made it across the U.S.-Mexico border near Calexico by drone.”283 
There were two men on the receiving end “who pleaded guilty to retrieving the drugs 
near California Highway 98 in Imperial County.”284 The news article concluded, “small 
drones, which have become easily accessible and affordable to the general public, can fly 
up to an hour and as far as five miles, and some can be navigated by preset GPS 
coordinates.”285 Not only are drones being used to smuggle drugs across the U.S.-Mexico 
border, drones are also used to smuggle drugs into prison. For example, in 2016, “a 
Maryland inmate arranged to have a drone fly the cargo over a 12-foot barbed-wire fence 
and drop them in the yard.”286 According to Heather Kelly, “most prisons are fortified 
with spotlights, armed guards, and cameras, but don’t have the technology to detect 
unmanned aerial vehicles.”287 The threat of drones continues to rise because “more than 
700,000 drones ship every month around the world.”288 However, not all drops are 
successful; sometimes the drones crash. They can be tossed around and forced down by 
wind very easily. Even if drones do crash, cartel members can still retrieve the drugs and 
sell them for a massive profit. Figure 11 shows a crashed drone that was carrying drugs. 
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Figure 11.  Crashed Drone Recovered by Authorities in Tijuana289 
For an illustrative example, suppose a member of the cartel wanted to purchase a 
drone for drug smuggling purposes. Some of the more expensive drones cost anywhere 
from a few thousand dollars to tens of thousands of dollars. Depending on what the 
cartels want, the more expensive ones may be more reliable. Some drones are known for 
carrying 28 pounds of drugs, which can be worth approximately $756,000 in wholesale 
value. The number of drug smuggling drones is unknown because drones are so popular 
that it is hard to determine whether a drone has smuggled drugs if the drugs are not 
present. In any case, suppose 50 drones successfully made drops in a destination across 
the border. This means that cartels would bring in a revenue of $37.8 million. It is 
conceivable to think that 50 drones have been successful because they are hard to detect 
visually and on radar. However, since there is a lack of data, the total success of using 
drones remains unknown. Due to flight distance limitations of drones, cartel members 
must be within a five-mile distance of the border if they want to use a basic drone. 
However, there are some drones that are built for further distances. For example, a 
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Colombian regional police commander, Jose Acevedo, told Christopher Woody of 
Business Insider that “a drone was used to carry cocaine to Panama, it had capacity to 
transport 10 kilos [22 pounds] on each trip and to travel a distance of 100 kilometers [62 
miles].”290 This example shows the persistence of cartels in their use of drones to 
transport drugs further than they did previously. The benefit of using drones is that it 
reduces risk of prosecution for the cartels to zero. Cartel members will do anything to 
evade capture and more so, to continue succeeding. 
3. Private Jets to Ghost Fleet 
In July 2011, an article was written about John Charles Ward, a pilot for Mexico’s 
Sinaloa cartel.291 The amount of drugs that he was able to transport in one trip weighed 
approximately 242 pounds, which has an estimated value of $6.5 million.292 According to 
a news article released by Motherboard, “Mexico has seized 599 airplanes and 
helicopters linked to the Sinaloa Cartel alone, nearly five times the size of Aeromexico’s 
fleet.”293 Additionally, Hawley informs that “since 2006, authorities have seized more 
than 400 drug planes—a fleet bigger than the Mexican air force itself.”294 Mexican 
authorities have seized 400 plus aircraft; however, actual number of aircraft in a cartels 
inventory is unknown. Figure 12 shows a drug seizure from a private aircraft with 450 
kilos of drugs onboard. 
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Figure 12.  Private Aircraft Carrying Drugs Seized295 
Bearing in mind the true numbers of cartel aircraft are unknown, suppose 400 
airplanes successfully delivered drugs across the border. These successes would generate 
a revenue of $2.6 billion. This revenue alone explains the persistence of cartels using 
private airplanes, even though more than 400 drug planes have been seized since 2006.296 
Additionally, suppose cartels only used 100 airplanes, but the planes have made multiple 
trips back and forth across the border. If each plane makes five trips, the cost of 
employing 100 airplanes would go down, but the revenue generated by five trips per 
aircraft would go up to $3.25 billion. No matter which combination cartels decide to 
deploy their aircraft, if successful, they will generate guaranteed, enormous profits. 
Moreover, airplanes are quite easy to get ahold of, especially if cartels are willing to pay 
full price. 
                                                 
295 Source: Woody, “Frozen Sharks.”  
296 Hawley, “As Drug Planes Get Seized, Cartels Adapt.”  
 79
E. ESTIMATING COCAINE FLOW THROUGH AIR SMUGGLING 
ROUTES 
In fiscal year 2016, the USCG estimated cocaine flow into the United States to be 
around 2,834 metric tons.297 In the same year, of the out of the 2,834 tons, the USCG 
removed approximately 201.3 metric tons from the sea.298 However, calculating the flow 
of cocaine through the air domain is difficult. Increased airport security and surveillance 
has more than likely caused this trend. For instance, data from a 2010 NDTA states that 
“the amount of drugs smuggled into the United States by couriers and in cargo aboard 
commercial aircraft is significantly less than the amount smuggled by other means.”299 
Additionally, the same NDTA reported that “6 percent of cocaine seizures were from 
commercial air conveyances.”300 Such a low percentage was “partially attributable to a 
shift in the smuggling by couriers on commercial flights to overland transportation across 
the Southwest Border as well as increased airport interdiction.”301 Smuggling by aircraft 
has changed significantly since 9/11, and cartels are more willing to risk smuggling 
overland than by air. 
F. ANALYSIS  
Table 3 represents my analysis comparing air methods of drug smuggling 
interdiction of domestic law enforcement and U.S. law enforcement, the estimated costs 
to risks, benefits, and finally, their ranking against each other. I rated ultralight aircraft as 
low when compared to domestic law enforcement risks because they are hard to detect 
and their missions are quick. According to Richard Marosi, “flying at night with lights 
out, and zipping back across the border in minutes, ultralight aircraft sightings are 
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rare.”302 While many ultralights remain undetectable, some are detected simply because 
“agents are instructed to turn off their engines and roll down their windows so they can 
listen for incursions by air.”303 I rated drones as low because, just like ultralight aircraft, 
drones are hard to detect on radar and are smaller than ultralight aircraft. Private jets are 
rated as high because there have been over 400 aircraft seized by authorities.304 Private 
jets are also easier to identify on radar and must have a flight plan coordinated with air 
control towers. 
Table 3.   Rating of Air Methods 
 Method 
  Ultralight  
Aircraft 








Medium Low High 
Estimated 
Costs/Risks 
Low-Medium Low High 




Best Second Best Worst 
 
U.S. law enforcement poses increased risk to these methods. I rated ultralight 
aircraft as medium because U.S. law enforcement has significantly better technology for 
detecting small aircraft than other countries. Additionally, advanced surveillance systems 
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and other aircraft assist with detection. Drones are still rated as low because they are 
difficult to pick up on radar. However, innovation may clear up this issue by developing 
technology that can pick up drones on radar. Private jets are rated as high because air 
traffic control towers are great at picking up these aircraft. Additionally, airspace is 
tightly controlled by the military. 
Determining the estimated costs to risks takes into account how much cartels must 
spend on aircraft, while also looking at the possible risks law enforcement puts on 
cartels’ operations. Ultralight aircraft is rated as low to medium because the relative cost 
of an ultralight aircraft is low, while law enforcement is increasing its situational 
awareness of ultralight aircraft and continuously seeking further developed technology to 
detect these types of aircraft. Drones are rated as low because everybody has access to the 
internet and could have one shipped to their house in days. Additionally, the relative cost 
for a basic drone can be a few hundred dollars, although a more sophisticated one is 
going to cost in the several thousand-dollar price range. Drones are difficult to detect on 
radar, which forces law enforcement to detect them using their eyes and ears.305 Private 
jets are rated as high due to their relatively high cost as compared to ultralight aircraft and 
drones. For instance, a Cessna Citation III goes for $650,000 on avbuyer.com.306  
While determining whether these methods are beneficial for cartel operations, I 
took into account the potential money spent on each aircraft, while also looking at the 
potential revenue each one generates. I rated ultralight aircraft as medium based on an 
ultralight aircraft going for $8,000 on EBay and by comparing it to the “219 pounds of 
drugs it can hold worth an estimated $109,500.”307 Ultralight aircraft are clearly 
beneficial to cartels. I rated drones as low to medium due to their limitation regarding the 
weight they can carry. Cartels can only weigh down a drone a certain amount before it 
can no longer fly. However, drones are relatively inexpensive and can generate $756,000 
from one drop. I rated private jets as medium because cartels have an arsenal of them, 
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and they can carry hundreds of pounds of drugs. Even though law enforcement may 
detect, identify, and track these aircraft, cartels still benefit from a few successful 
missions. 
After rating these methods, it is important to rank them appropriately. I ranked 
ultralight aircraft as the best, drones as second best, and private jets as the worst. Private 
jets are ranked as the worst because they are easily detected on radar, and they must have 
a flight plan. Otherwise, it raises a red flag with authorities, who immediately hail the 
aircraft. Additionally, radars show where the aircraft is coming from, and if authorities 
are suspicious, they can greet the aircraft upon landing and conduct an inspection of the 
pilot and aircraft. Drones are ranked as second best because they can go undetected on 
radar and sometimes visually; however, they are limited in weight and are uncontrollable 
in weather. Drones reduce the human operator to a human controller, eliminating any 
possibility of arrest. I ranked ultralight aircraft as the best because the missions are quick, 
they fly fairly low to the ground to avoid detection, and all they have to do is release the 
drugs and travel back across the border before being identified. Ultralight aircraft have 
the greatest potential to continuously benefit cartels. 
What does Table 3 mean for cartels? Table 3 provides a reasonable explanation in 
determining which methods are the most beneficial for cartels to use in the air. In this 
case, ultralight aircraft are the most beneficial, followed by drones, and then private jets. 
For a hypothetical case, suppose cartels smuggled similar volumes of drugs through each 
of these methods. Both ultralight aircraft and drones are limited in the amount of drugs 
they can carry, while private jets can carry more. In 2015, Snejana Farberov reported, “a 
1976 Gulfstream II jet transported 485lbs of cocaine worth $6.5 million into South 
Florida last year.”308 While one private jet was able to transport 485lbs of cocaine, it 
would take 22 drones or two ultralight aircraft. This means that there are more chances 
for law enforcement to interdict drones or ultralight aircraft; however, private jets are 
riskier due to the scrutiny they undergo when entering U.S. controlled air space. 
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Additionally, given the easy access to ultralight aircraft and drones, cartels are more 
likely use these methods for smuggling operations. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The aircraft discussed in this chapter are the most common air smuggling methods 
cartels use in their operations. Cartels will continue to find innovative ways to get their 
drugs across the border, including evolving air methods. The air domain has transformed 
from free flying to requiring flight plans and oversight from air traffic controllers. It is 
commonly known that the incidents of 9/11 have caused major shifts in the air domain, 
resulting in significantly increased security and scrutiny. Increased security has deterred 
cartels from primarily using the air domain, which is why methods in the land and sea 
domains are reported more frequently on the news.  
In the following chapter, I explain why this research matters to the U.S. 
government, military, and citizens, the international community, and scholars who 
conduct research on this topic. Additionally, I created a table comparing all methods 
under each domain. This provides a collective visual of how each method ranks against 
another and shows which major domain is the best and why, as well as which sub-method 
is the best and why. Upon this conclusion, I discuss how changes in technology might 
change the calculation of which method is better. Furthermore, I write a policy approach 
for law enforcement and DOD to address the most likely method now and also to prepare 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 85
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I explain why the United States government, military and citizens, 
the international community, and scholars should care about this research and issue. 
Second, I provide a complete analysis of land, sea, and air domains by generating a table 
to identify the most beneficial domain for cartels, as well as the most beneficial sub-
method. Also, I discuss how I arrived to this conclusion by summarizing each domain. 
Third, upon completion of my analysis, I discuss how changes in technology might 
change the calculation of which method is better. Furthermore, I provide a policy 
approach that will explain the new use of technology and resources to address the most 
likely method now and also to prepare the DOD for the future of drug smuggling and 
what should happen. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
The answer to the research question is critical to the United States government, 
military, and citizens, the international community, and scholars who conduct research on 
this topic. Each of these entities are affected either directly or indirectly due to the 
potential dangers associated with cartel organizations. Not only is conducting research on 
this topic important to critical thinking among important individuals, it provides the 
framework to allow these individuals to make important decisions in their daily lives that 
affect the security of the United States. Furthermore, nothing is more important than 
individual, national, and international security, as well as to promote further awareness 
on this topic, where it is currently weakest. 
1. Why Should the United States Government Care about This 
Research? 
A national drug control strategy is submitted from the president to Congress each 
year. The strategy for 2016 aimed to  
strengthen efforts to prevent drug use in our communities; seek early 
intervention opportunities in health care; increasing access to treatment 
and supporting long-term recover; criminal justice reform: making the 
system more effective and fair; disrupt domestic drug trafficking and 
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production; strengthen law enforcement and international partnerships to 
reduce the availability of foreign-produced drugs in the United States; and 
improve information systems for analysis, assessment, and local 
management.309  
Weak law enforcement and dysfunctional international partnerships are at the heart of the 
drug smuggling problem, but increased efforts from DHS and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) can generate stronger national security, which is important to all Americans. 
Because agencies within DHS and DOJ deem drug smuggling as a major threat to 
national security and to American individuals, agencies should increase assets and 
patrolling of land, sea, and air drug smuggling routes. 
DHS’s responsibility is to “effectively secure U.S. air, land, and sea points of 
entry; safeguard and streamline lawful trade and travel; and disrupt and dismantle 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations.”310 DOJ has three overarching, 
strategic goals; however, the second is to “prevent crime, protect the rights of the 
American People, and enforce federal law”311 while also “enforcing and upholding 
federal law against the flow of drugs across the Southwest Border and the associated 
violent crimes.”312 These two departments within the United States government are 
designated with securing U.S. borders and coastline, and they are directly responsible for 
interdicting land, sea, and air drug smuggling routes.  
The United States has implemented a national southwest border counternarcotic 
strategy that “involves drug trafficking, alien smuggling, weapons trafficking, and money 
laundering which highlights some of the national security implications of criminal 
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activity along the SWB.”313 Despite this, illicit drugs are still being smuggled into the 
United States today. Some routes could be initiated on land, but end up transitioning to 
sea or air routes along the way. For example, drugs could be smuggled out of Colombia 
and then transported through the three maritime corridors that enter the United States. 
However, illicit drugs do not need to remain on a vessel while penetrating the United 
States’ shoreline. Before reaching the United States, illicit drugs can be offloaded in 
Mexico and then continue via an air or land route. 
2. Why Should the United States Military Care about This Research?  
One of the USCG’s primary missions is drug interdiction operations. According 
to the USCG, “Coast Guardsmen are the nation’s first line of defense against smugglers 
seeking to bring illicit substances into the United States by sea, and account for more than 
half of all U.S. Government seizures of cocaine each year.”314 One of USN’s AOR is 
Central and South America (USNAVSO), from where most cocaine sold in the United 
States comes.315 The USN’s goal, in conjunction with the USCG, is to protect and defend 
the nation against illicit drugs brought into the United States from smugglers in the 
Caribbean and Central and South America. While the USCBP interdicts drug smuggling 
operations at sea and on land whenever possible, only 334 personnel are assigned as 
marine interdiction agents, who complete 76 hours of underway per day,316 which means 
approximately 10 boats are underway on a given day. Nearly 20,000 personnel are 
assigned as border patrol agents responsible for processing and inspecting everything that 
enters the United States.317 These three entities are pivotal in securing and protecting the 
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United States, which is why the United States government cares about cartels and the 
success they have in the land, sea, and air domains. Otherwise, the United States 
government would dictate that the USCBP, USCG, and USN concentrate on other 
missions. 
3. Why Should United States Citizens Care about This Research? 
Air, land, and maritime domains, as well as the drug smuggling routes associated 
with them, exist due to the demand of illicit drugs by American citizens. If demand 
continues to exist, so will the routes that are used to get the drugs into the United States. 
Drug smuggling routes, whether land, sea or air, play a significant role in the continuous 
cycle of U.S. security operations. With all of the traffic at the border between U.S. and 
Mexico as well as all ships at ports of entry and all aircraft entering and exiting the 
United States comes the potential for serious harm to Americans not only living near 
ports of entry or at the southern border, but throughout the United States. One of the 
harms that comes with drugs is deaths related to drug use. According to the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, “About 570,000 people die annually in the United States due to 
drug use, of which 22,000 die due to overdose from illicit drugs,”318 which is nearly 4 
percent of the total number of drug-related deaths. In 2015, according to the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health, “approximately 27.1 million people were illicit drug 
users.”319 While only a small percentage of drug users die of illicit drug overdose, there 
are many more who admit to using illicit drugs. Illicit drug use has been and continues to 
be a problem plaguing the United States and its citizens. 
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4. Why Should the International Community Care about This 
Research?  
The UNODC is “the global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and 
international crime.”320 Not only is drug smuggling a problem for the United States, it is a 
global problem. According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report of 2016, other regions 
combating drug smuggling operations that have reported continued drug abuse reflects 
“information updated by 20 countries, mostly in North America, South America and 
Western and Central Europe.”321 Even though only 20 countries have reported their drug 
problem over recent years, many other countries could have drug issues but did not have 
the resources or desire to report their issues to the UNODC.  
Human rights abuses caused by cartels, such as killing innocent civilians to 
transport drugs across the border or forcing individuals to become human smugglers have 
become common abuses perpetrated by drug cartels. In addition to human rights abuses, 
corruption of law enforcement authorities is another major issue related to cartels. It is 
common for cartels to pay off local law enforcement or use other forms of coercion to 
corrupt officials. These are the main reasons why international countries should care 
about illicit drugs that flow through their countries because not only does it cause an 
issue of individual drug abuse, it also causes problems among the government and law 
enforcement, which in turn makes the country a dangerous place in which to live.  
5. Why Should We as Academics Care about This Research? 
Academic scholars have been providing research on this topic for over a decade, 
and it continues to be a topic of interest for scholars. While many researchers study 
specific cartels and their respective home countries, some researchers study the methods 
and techniques that cartels use to smuggle their drugs into the United States. Scholars add 
beneficial insight into how drug smugglers think and their adaptability to law 
enforcement interdiction. This research is then used by many law enforcement agencies 
to determine their approach to countering drug smuggling operations. That being said, 
                                                 
320 “About UNODC,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed October 15, 2016, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop.  
321 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report.  
 90
this project will also assist law enforcement agencies in determining which domain 
cartels are most likely to use to smuggle drugs, this in turn will allow law enforcement 
agencies to focus their resources on the most beneficial and successful domain used by 
cartels. 
B. OVERALL ANALYSIS 
Table 4 represents my analysis of all methods across each domain determining 
which method is the best to which method is the worst for cartels. I referenced the tables 
from Chapters II, III, and IV to generate Table 4 that provides my final ranking of each 
method among all others. Tunnel take first place. The reason why I chose tunnels for first 
place is because they have the potential to generate unlimited profits. Even though 
multiple tunnels have been seized recently, and in the past, it is still possible that some 
tunnels have not been found, in which case cartels could transport drugs as frequently as 
they want to without law enforcement’s knowledge of their operations. Additionally, if 
only one tunnel remains operable, cartels could generate enough revenue to sustain their 
operations solely using this method.  
Table 4.   Overall Ranking of Methods 
 
 
Semi-submersibles are ranked second because they cannot self-sustain themselves 
like a tunnel can. Also, even though they generate $405 million for one trip, they must 
travel at least 3,500 miles if initially transiting from Colombia, traveling up the Pacific 
corridor and ending in the United States. Farther distances require longer travel times, 
and in this case, tunnels are much shorter (2,400 feet) and require less time to transit. 
These reasons are why semi-submersibles are ranked second to tunnels. 
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Panga go-fast boats are ranked third because they do not generate as much profit 
as tunnels or semi-submersibles, however, they do generate more profit than big rigs or 
cars if one trip is successful. Pangas generate approximately $54 million in one trip and 
when compared to big rigs, which generate $3.2 million, or cars, which generate $1 
million, the profit is considerably larger. Pangas may transport up to 2,000 pounds of 
drugs, while big rigs transport 119 pounds and cars transport 38 pounds. The difference 
here is that pangas are not mandated to cross a border inspection checkpoint while big 
rigs and cars are. Since big rigs and cars could be further inspected at these checkpoints, 
cartels must place their drugs in strategic hiding spaces and must limit the amount they 
carry. For these reasons, a big rig was ranked as fourth and a car fifth.  
Ultralight aircraft is ranked sixth because it is limited in the amount of drugs it 
can transport, while also facing cutting-edge technology better equipped in detecting 
these ultralight aircrafts than before. Drones are facing similar problems but are further 
limited in the amount of drugs they can transport than ultralight aircraft, which is why 
they are ranked seventh. Ultralight aircraft can transport approximately 219 pounds of 
drugs while drones can transport approximately 28 pounds. Ultralight aircraft and drones 
have been used recently, however, environmental factors such as rain or wind pose severe 
risks to these methods, which lead to loss of drugs, loss of aircraft, and specifically for 
ultralight aircraft, loss of life.  
Container vessels are ranked eighth because of the scrutiny they go through when 
entering port. Unless the vessel is cleared for entry prior to entering territorial waters, it 
must go through a rigorous document inspection and query as to what they have onboard. 
Most vessels are usually cleared before entering port so they do not need to go through 
said process. Even though container vessels are known for transporting 4,000 pounds of 
drugs, it would be difficult to both on load and offload said drugs without being 
suspicious. Private jets face the same scrutiny as container vessels, which is why it is 
ranked ninth. Some private jets have been known to transport nearly 250 pounds of drugs, 
however, this number is much smaller than what tunnels or semi-submersibles can 
transport. Additionally, aircraft surveillance systems and air traffic controllers have 
provided increased oversight on small and large aircraft, resulting in a more secure 
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domain. As security at ports of entry increased over the years, cartels have steered away 
from these types of methods. 
Mules are ranked tenth because the human body can only transport .35 pounds of 
drugs, and the individual willing to perform this type of smuggling operation risks their 
life every second those drugs are in their body. Additionally, law enforcement is well 
trained in detecting suspicious activity, especially that of a mule. If cartels seek large 
profits, they must use thousands of mules to generate anything significant. Of the top five 
ranked methods, land domain has three while sea domain has two. Cartels prefer to use 
land domain methods due to its accessibility, dependability, and originality.  
C. CAUSES OF SHIFTS IN DOMAIN OR METHOD 
What may cause a cartel to shift from one domain to another? This is evident 
when cartels shifted from the Caribbean corridor to the Central America-Mexico 
corridor.322 According to Chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security Michael 
T. McCaul, “Operational control of the border must be predicated on full situational 
awareness—meaning a complete picture as to whom and what are crossing the 
border.”323 Additionally, he went on to caution, “If situational awareness is not obtained, 
then DHS cannot know for certain that the border is truly secure, nor can it make 
informed decisions as to where to deploy its agents, infrastructure, and technology,”324 
and for now “DHS has not been able to gain full situational awareness.”325 If DHS 
cannot control the southern border, then cartels have a leg up over law enforcement and 
will be able to randomly choose which method they will use to transport drugs without 
law enforcement being able to guess when and where the operation will take place. 
Additionally, cartels will exploit this and use it to their advantage and continuously 
alternating between domains and methods—as seen in the past. 
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Technology plays a vital role in both drug smuggling operations and law 
enforcement agencies. Without technology, it would be extremely hard for law 
enforcement to detect, identify, track, and ultimately, interdict smuggling operations. For 
example, Border Patrol Acting Chief Ronald Vitiello warned, “The Border Security IPT, 
consisting of senior representatives from S&T, CBP, USCG, ICE, Department of Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO), and Joint Requirements Council (JRC), has identified several 
key R&D needs, including small dark aircraft detection, tunnel detection, surveillance 
and forensics, and maritime surveillance and communications in remote 
environments.”326 While USCBP is actively engaged in searching for cartels’ clandestine 
operations, there is still a need for continued research on advanced technology to create 
an easier way of detecting and identifying suspicious smuggling activities. Technology 
has a huge potential to force cartels to alter smuggling routes from one domain to another 
or one method to another. As technology proves to benefit law enforcement on land, 
cartels may alter to sea or air. As technology proves to benefit law enforcement on the 
sea, cartels may alter to land or air, and so on. 
Money is a major contributing factor as to why cartels may alter from one domain 
or from one method to another. There could be many reasons: 1) cartels are not yielding 
as much profit in one domain as they could in another; 2) cartels may find it more 
expensive to transport drugs in one domain as compared to another; 3) cartels may find it 
less expensive to operate in one domain; however, the ratio of expense to profit remains 
low; or 4) law enforcement is seizing drugs at a higher rate causing cartels to lose more 
money than they were making in the respective domain. Potential profits and revenue is 
the driving force of cartel operations and dictates which methods under which domain 
cartels will use in future operations. 
One final example of why cartels may alter their operations from one domain or 
one method to another is interdiction rates by law enforcement agencies. Land, sea, and 
air domains are guarded by USCBP, USCG and USN, and TSA respectively. These four 
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entities operate within their respective domains with limited funding, personnel, and 
assets due to the large funding required by other defense entities. However, even with 
limitations, these entities are successful at interdicting cartels’ drug smuggling 
operations. Despite this, there are still issues with interdiction success. One entity may be 
stronger at a certain point in time than another. For example, while the USCBP interdicts 
tons of drugs at the U.S.-Mexico border, the USCG and Navy could interdict minimum 
amounts, allowing cartels to be more successful at sea. The same scenario could happen 
for the other domains.  
D. POLICY ISSUES 
The most problematic domain to interdict on is land, with tunnels being the most 
problematic method with which that law enforcement must contend. Tunnels are the most 
problematic because they are almost always invisible to law enforcement, unless officers 
get information from either informants or previously caught cartel members of operations 
currently ongoing, or randomly stumble across a tunnel while on patrol.327 According to 
the USCBP, a Border Patrol agent was on patrol when “the agent noticed a depression in 
the soil along the banks of the All-American Canal, and upon approach, the soil began to 
give way exposing a hole 18 inches in diameter.”328 Some investigations take nearly 
eight months before gathering enough information to move in and seize the tunnel.329 
After discovery, some tunnels are filled in with concrete, and “since 2007, it has cost 
Customs and Border Protection $8.7 million to fill drug tunnels, according to a 2016 
report by the Department of Homeland Security.”330 However, Mexico has not been able 
to fill tunnels on its side due to limited funds and so have sealed the entrances.331 
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Therefore, cartels are starting to resurrect certain tunnels.332 This shows how the United 
States and Mexican governments need to better cooperate and communicate with each 
other. Additionally, as technology improves and detection of underground tunnels 
improves, cartels may be forced away from using tunnels and switch to sea routes, 
changing my ranking from tunnels to panga go-fast boats as most beneficial to cartels. 
Many congressional researchers already discuss the issues for policy in regard to 
illicit drug smuggling and the threat it poses on Americans. Many discuss the importance 
of reducing both supply and demand sides of drug production and consumption.333 
However, according to Seelke et al., “at the same time, others argue that further emphasis 
on supply-side drug control activities is warranted.”334 While law enforcement continues 
to focus on these areas, interdiction funding should be increased. Without increased 
funding for law enforcement personnel, assets, technology, and research and 
development, cartels will always find a way to get drugs into the United States. The focus 
of policy makers and should no longer be on demand or supply. Instead, their focus 
should be on increasing law enforcement presence to deter cartels from risking seizure of 
their illicit drugs. However, to some extent, cartels will inevitably cross the border as 
their business continues to flourish in the United States. 
Funding for assets and personnel continue to plague U.S. entities. For example, in 
his congressional testimony, General Kelly stated, “force allocation cuts by the Services 
are taking their toll on operational results; in 2013, Operation MARTILLO disrupted 132 
metric tons of cocaine, compared with 152 metric tons of cocaine in 2012, due to limited 
assets.”335 Additionally, he explained “when better resourced several years ago, we were 
able to disrupt a significant amount—more than 240 metric tons—of cocaine heading 
towards the United States.”336 Kelly also testified, “last year, 20 more metric tons of 
cocaine reached the United States due to reduced asset availability, a number that will 
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increase inversely as the availability of U.S. government assets decreases.”337 A general 
perception here is that the United States government deals with the flow of drugs into the 
United States fairly well and is not willing to invest in a higher budget, more personnel, 
more assets, and more time to prevent a larger amount of drugs from getting into the 
United States. While it may be inevitable that some drugs will cross the borders, policy 
makers can take some steps to reduce the flow. 
E. WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE? 
The United States and international community have a good idea of how cartels 
smuggle drugs within and throughout South and Central America, the Caribbean, and 
Mexico into the United States. Since there are so many diverse methods and means of 
smuggling drugs, law enforcement agencies should concentrate on developing and 
implementing better technology, as well as introducing better training methods for their 
personnel. Law enforcement agencies are only limited with what they have, how they use 
it, and who can be trained to use it. While law enforcement agencies are limited in 
funding, they can adapt and overcome this limitation by becoming proficient with patrols, 
and hiring individuals that actually care about the mission at hand. No one can predict the 
future; however, learning from the past can shape and improve how law enforcement 
agencies adapt in the future. 
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